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Abstract 
 
With the advent of the knowledge economy, patents play an increasingly important 
role in protecting innovators’ inventions. The number of granted patents has been 
constantly increasing since 2000 in most of the major economies of the world. On the 
other hand, more and more patentees are willing to enforce their patents in litigations. 
The number of patent litigations doubled in the US from 2009 to 2015 and increased to 
over seven times in China from 2000 to 2015. With an increasing number of patents 
being granted and the increase of patentees’ propensity to litigate their patents, 
innovators face an increasing patent litigation risk either as a patent litigant or as an 
alleged infringer. As patent litigation is usually costly, it is important for innovators to 
manage their patent litigation risk. This dissertation provides an empirical study of some 
issues regarding patent litigation risk assessment. I design the research from the 
perspective of innovators and focus on their risk of being involved in patent litigation as 
a patent litigant. Chapters 3 and 4 are the main body of this dissertation and make some 
comparative studies between the US, Japan, and China at the patent level, while 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide supplement studies using samples in Japan at the firm level. 
In Chapter 3, I make a comparative study of the effects of different aspects of patent 
value on patent damage awards between the US, Japan, and China. I examine the effects 
of three most well-established patent value indicators and find that the number of 
forward citations positively impacts the patent damage awards ruled by Japanese judges. 
In contrast, family size positively impacts patent damage awards ruled by Chinese 
judges and US judges. In addition, none of the indicators of patent value has a 
significant effect on patent damage awards ruled by US juries. As these indicators 
reflect different aspects of patent value, these findings suggest that judges in the US, 
Japan, and China attach weight to different aspects of patent value when determining 
patent damages. The findings in this chapter will enable patentees to have a clearer 
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understanding of the determinants of patent damage awards and to make a more precise 
prediction of the stakes of litigating a patent in the US, Japan, and China.  
In Chapter 4, I provide a comparative study of the characteristics of patent litigation 
at the patent level between the US, Japan, and China. Although most of the 
characteristics tested in this chapter are those previously tested in the US or Germany, 
three of them are introduced for the first time in this study. I find that although common 
characteristics of litigated patents exist between the litigated patents in the US, Japan, 
and China, some differences also identified in this study. For example, the number of 
International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses has a significantly negative effect on 
the probability of litigation in the US, but no significant effect is found in Japan and 
China. These findings enable patentees to identify patent litigation risk more precisely.  
In Chapter 5, I further examine the characteristics of patent litigation at the firm level 
using a sample in Japan. I find that the characteristics of patent litigation at the firm 
level are greatly consistent with those at the patent level identified in Chapter 4. For 
instance, like their counterparts at the patent level, the ratio of patents whose family size 
is more than one, the average number of forward citations, and the average number of 
backward citations also have a significantly positive effect on the probability of 
litigation at the firm level. However, unlike their counterparts at the patent level, no 
significant effect on the probability of litigation is found at the firm level for the average 
number of words in the first independent claims, the ratio of patents asserting domestic 
priority, the average number of inventors.  
In Chapter 6, I study the impact of patent litigation on the subsequent patenting 
behavior of the plaintiff small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Japan. I find that the 
number of patent applications filed by the plaintiff SMEs significantly decreases in the 
second and third year after patent litigation. This negative effect is more significant for 
the litigations with extremely high costs. I argue that this is most probably caused by 
SMEs’ regular R&D activities being negatively affected by the high costs of patent 
litigation. Moreover, I also find that the quality (strength and enforceability) of patents 
filed by the plaintiff SMEs increases subsequently after patent litigation. This indicates 
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that patent litigation provides a good chance for SMEs to learn to apply for stronger 
patents. These findings will enable SME patentees to evaluate patent litigation risk more 
comprehensively.  
To summarize, this dissertation contributes to the literature on patent litigation risk 
management. It contributes to the literature on patent valuation which is seldom 
conducted in Japan and China. It is also the first academic attempt to study patent 
litigation comparatively between China and other countries and greatly contributes to 
the future research on patent litigation in China. 
Key words: patent litigation; risk assessment; patent damages; litigated patents; 
patent litigants; the effect of patent litigation 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Increasing Patent Litigation Risk  
In the era of the knowledge economy, intellectual property (IP) assets, such as patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, play an increasingly important role in firms’ 
business activities. Two facts evidence this. First, intellectual property has become one 
of the most important sources of competitive advantage for many firms (Watanabe and 
Yoneyama, 2004). Second, the value of intellectual property assets has exceeded that of 
tangible assets such as buildings, machinery, and fixed assets in most firms in modern 
times (Simensky and Osterberg, 1999).  
Recognition of the value of intellectual properties has motivated firms to compete to 
create intellectual properties and apply for IP rights. In this dissertation, I will focus on 
patent right, a key component of IP rights. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 show the growth of the 
number of patent applications and the growth of the number of granted patents 
respectively in China (CN), Europe (EP), Japan (JP), Korea (KR), and the US. The 
number of patent applications and the number of granted patents in these countries or 
areas increased by up to 2.5 and 2.8 times respectively from 2000 to 2015. 
Figure 1-1. The growth of the number of patent applications 
 (Data source: WIPO statistics database) 
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Figure 1-2. The growth of the number of granted patents 
Data source: WIPO statistics database 
On the other hand, firms are facing increasingly intense competition in the knowledge 
economy. To gain competitive advantage, more and more patentees tend to enforce their 
patent rights in litigation. Figures 1-3 and 1-4 show the changes in the number of patent 
cases filed in the US and in China respectively during the period of 2000 to 2015. It can 
be seen that the number of patent infringement suits doubled from 2009 to 2015 in the 
US. The growth tendency is even sharper in China. Figure 1-4 shows that the number of 
patent infringement suits in China increased by seven times from 2000 to 2015. 
Figure 1-3. The growth of the number of patent cases filed in the US 
Data source: Judicial Facts and Figures (US Courts)  
 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
at
en
t 
ca
se
s
year
Chapter 1 Introduction 
3 
Figure 1-4. The growth of the number of patent cases filed in China  
(Sum of invention patent, utility model patent, and design patent cases) 
Data Source: Intellectual Property Protection by Chinese Courts;  
Annual Report of the Supreme People’s Court on Intellectual Property Cases. 
With an increasing number of patent rights being granted and the increase of 
patentees’ litigation propensity, firms are facing the growing risk of being involved in 
patent litigation, either as a patent litigant or as an alleged infringer. In some cases, 
firms infringe others’ patent rights deliberately because the stakes are high. In other 
cases, though firms innovate by themselves, they may infringe on others’ patent rights 
innocently due to a lack of extensive patent clearance search. Moreover, firms may also 
be involved in patent litigation because the components or machines purchased from 
other firms infringe others’ patent rights. This phenomenon typically occurs in the 
smartphone industry. Besides, patent cases filed by non-practicing entities (NPEs), 
which is a new threat for innovators, have increased significantly in the US since 2010.  
Moreover, patent litigation risk is also reflected in the high costs of patent litigation. 
According to a survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Association 
(AIPA) in 2015, for a claim less than $1 million, the average cost of patent litigation is 
$873, 000; for a claim between $1 million and $25 million, it is $ 2.2 million; for a 
claim between $10 million and $25 million, it is $3.5 million; and for a claim over $25 
million, the figure is $ 6.3 million. In addition to these direct costs, there are also 
various indirect costs, which take many forms (Bessen and Meurer, 2008). First, a great 
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deal of time that managers and researchers spend in litigation might disrupt a firm’s 
regular business activities. Second, patent litigation might destroy the cooperative 
relationship between two parties. Third, for firms with weak fiscal capacities, patent 
litigation may decrease their credits because of a possible bankruptcy risk.  
1.2 Key Issues Regarding Patent Litigation Risk Assessment  
Considering the increasing risk of being involved in patent litigation and the high 
costs of patent litigation, it is important for firms to manage their patent litigation risk in 
their daily routines. Figure 1-5 reproduces the general risk management process defined 
in ISO 31000:2009, an international standard of risk management codified by the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO).  
Figure 1-5. Risk management process from ISO 31000: 2009 
According to this standard, a sound risk management process consists of five 
elements: communication and consultation, establishing the context, risk assessment, 
risk treatment, and monitoring and review. Among these elements, risk assessment plays 
a key role in risk management. In fact, in view of the importance of risk assessment in 
risk management, the ISO and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
codified another standard called ISO/IEC 31010: 2009 to provide guidance on risk 
assessment techniques.  
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 In the case of patent litigation risk management, the precise assessment of the 
magnitude of patent litigation risk is an essential step for firms to take effective measures 
to treat it. Based on the framework of risk management above, I summarized some key 
issues regarding patent litigation risk assessment in Figure 1-6. From this figure, patent 
litigation risk assessment needs at least three aspects of information.  
Figure 1-6. Key issues regarding patent litigation risk assessment 
(1) Predicting the possibility of litigation 
Patent litigation risk assessment first involves the prediction of patent litigation. Two 
kinds of patent litigation risks exist for an innovator. On the one hand, an innovator is 
always confronted with the risk of being a patent litigant if it owns patents in force 
because it is impossible for them to control others’ infringement acts. On the other hand, 
as noted above, an innovate is always confronted the risk of being sued as a patent 
infringer because he may infringe others’ patent rights deliberately or innocently, or just 
be deemed as infringed. Since the probability of litigation for different patents varies 
greatly, it is essential for innovators to manage to distinguish the patents of a higher 
probability of litigation from those of lower probability of litigation. This helps them 
make a better resource allocation for monitoring infringement, preparing for litigation, 
or doing extensive clearance search.  
The probability of patent litigation
factors that affect the 
probability of litigation
The probability of each possible 
outcome of patent litigation
factors that affects the 
probability of each outcome
The benefits and costs of 
patent litigation
①
②
③
Patent litigation risk assessment
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(2) Predicting the possibility of each outcome 
The second information necessary for patent litigation is that the possibility of each 
outcome of patent litigation. The possible outcomes of patent litigation are settlement, 
winning and losing. In addition, in the case of winning, the prediction of patent damage 
awards will be a further issue. Predicting the possibility of each outcome will be very 
helpful in the evaluation of the magnitude of patent litigation risk. This is true both for a 
potential patent litigant and for a potential alleged patent infringer. 
(3) Predicting the benefits and costs of patent litigation 
Winning and losing a patent litigation will surely benefit or cause losses to the parties. 
Furthermore, regardless of its outcome, patent litigation itself has both positive and 
negative effects on the parties. For instance, patent litigation has an announcement 
effect to deter potential infringement because filing an infringement lawsuit reflects a 
patentee’s willingness to assert its patent rights. On the other hand, the high costs of 
patent litigation may negatively impact its regular business activities. Grasping these 
benefits and costs of patent litigation will help the parties evaluate the risk more 
comprehensively.  
1.3 Previous Literature 
1.3.1 The Determinants of Patent Damage Awards 
Although patent litigants can benefit from patent litigation in various ways, patent 
damage awards are one of the key beneficial outcomes. However, patent damage awards 
involve so many uncertainties that they are commonly thought to be systematically 
unpredictable. Recently, several prior studies have attempted to solve this puzzle by 
constructing prediction models to identify the determinants of patent damage awards. 
Lai and Che (2009) attempted to model US patent damage awards with two neural 
network methods, Extension Neural Network and Back-Propagation Neural Network, 
with 17 indicators of patent property (Lai and Che, 2009a; 2009b). Mazzero et al. (2013) 
constructed a series of econometric models explaining over 75% of the variation in the 
US patent damage awards. In addition, Li (2015) studied patent damage awards in 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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China and found that the courts in China determine statutory compensation by different 
principles according to the infringers’ industry attributes. For the traditional fast moving 
consumer goods, the scale of sales and the sale price of the infringing product have a 
significant effect on patent infringement damages. For durable customer goods, the 
court also considers sales coverage and the infringement extent of the infringing product. 
For a knowledge-based new product, the court further refers to the plaintiff’s claims.  
1.3.2 The Characteristics of Patent Litigation 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) summarized four key determinants of patent 
litigation: the likelihood that a litigious situation or event, which could be considered an 
infringement of patent rights occurs and is detected by the patentees or exclusive 
licensees, a divergence in the parties’ expectation of the outcome of a trial, a divergence 
in the parties’ expectation of the damages to be awarded, and the cost of trial relative to 
the cost of settlement. Although theoretically, these determinants will be very useful in 
predicting patent litigation, as they are always unobservable, it is difficult to make use 
of them directly and thus it is necessary to find some observable indicators to identify 
patent litigation. In view of the fact that patent characteristics usually correlate with 
some of these determinants, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) made a first attempt to 
predict the probability of litigation for a given patent by identifying the characteristics 
of US litigated patents. After that, the characteristics of litigated patents have been 
extensively studied in several later studies. Table 1-1 summarizes the prior findings.  
Technology fields 
Using a sample of US patent cases between 1980 and 1984, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2001) found that the litigation rate is highest for patents in the 
technology field (classified by IPC codes) of drugs and health (2.01%), and lowest for 
patents in the technology field of chemical (0.54%). They updated their findings (2004) 
by showing that during the period from 1978 to 1995, the litigation rate is lowest for 
patents in the technology fields (classified by USPC codes) of chemicals (1.18%), 
electronics (1.54%), and mechanics (1.69%); modest for patents in the pharmaceutical 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Table 4-1. The Effects of Patent Characteristics on the Probability of Litigation 
Intrinsic characteristics Effect  Sample 
 Technology field 
Highest for biotechnology 
Lowest for chemicals 
US and German patent cases 
 Number of claims + US and German patent cases 
 Number of IPC codes － US patent cases 
 Family size  + US and German patent cases 
 Number of backward citations No consensus US and German patent cases 
 Domestic family size + US patent cases 
 Opposition + German patent cases 
 Prosecution length + US patent cases 
 Patent Age + US patent cases 
Acquired characteristics Effect Sample 
 Number of forward citations + US patent cases 
 Change of ownership + US patent cases 
 Change of owner size + US patent cases 
 Number of reassignments + US patent cases 
Maintenance fees + US patent cases 
 Ex Parte Reexamined + US patent cases 
 Patent collateralization + US patent cases 
Characteristics of patentees Effect Sample 
Patent portfolio size － US and German patent cases 
Firm size No consensus US and German patent cases 
Nationality Domestic > Foreign US and German patent cases 
 
field (2.22%); and highest for patents in the other health fields (3.46%), miscellaneous 
group (3.42%), biotechnology (2.79%), and computers (2.56%). Allison (2003) 
classified US patents into six industries and found that patents in the industries of drugs 
and medicine and computer and communications are more likely to be litigated than 
those in the mechanical, chemical, electrical, and electronic industries are. Moreover, 
Lerner (2010) found that the litigation rate is significantly higher for financial patents 
than that for patents as a whole in the US.  
Meanwhile, Cremers (2004) found that in Germany, the litigation rate of patents in 
the pharmaceutical and mechanical fields is significantly higher than that in the 
technology fields of chemicals and electronics. Cremers argued that the lower litigation 
rate for patents in the chemical field is due to the easy detection of imitation of patents, 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
9 
which makes it easier for the parties to reach a similar expectation of the outcome of 
patent litigation and thus reach a settlement. This logic is theoretically applicable to 
patents in the electronic, mechanical, and drugs fields. However, Cremers found that 
patents in the pharmaceutical field are more likely to be litigated than those in other 
technology fields are. This may be because the pharmaceutical field defined in Cremers’ 
study includes not only drugs but also biotechnology. Moreover, Cremers also argued 
that the highest litigation rate for patents in the mechanical field in Germany is due to 
the high percentage of mechanical patents owned by SMEs, which are more likely to be 
litigated than those owned by large firms in Germany are.  
Although prior studies have reached no agreement on the litigation rate across 
different technology fields, it can be concluded that patents in the chemical technology 
field are less likely to be litigated and patents in the biotechnology and computer 
technology fields have a higher probability of litigation. The former is probably due to 
the easy detection of imitation or infringement in the chemical technology field, which 
results in a lower infringement rate or higher probability of settlement. The latter is 
probably due to high uncertainty in these new technology fields which results in a 
divergence in the parties’ expectations regarding the outcome of the litigation, and thus 
hinders them from reaching a settlement. 
The number of claims 
Empirical evidence shows that litigated patents on average have more claims than 
issued patents (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; 2004; Allison et al., 2003; Cremers, 
2004; Chien, 2011). There are two possible interpretations for this phenomenon. First, 
as it is costly to draft, file, and prosecute a patent application with more claims, more 
claims in a patent indicate the applicant’s higher expectation of benefits from this patent. 
Thereby, a large number of claims in a patent indicate its higher value and thus make it 
more likely to be imitated and infringed. Second, the existence of more claims also 
indicates a broader patent scope, which will trap the infringement more easily. Both of 
these interpretations indicate that the existence of more claims in a patent leads to a 
higher probability of litigation for it. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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The number of 4-digit IPC subclasses 
Patents are assigned 9-digit International Patent Classification (IPC) codes by patent 
examiners according to their technology fields. As a patent may belong to multiple 
technology fields, it could have more than one IPC code. Prior studies found that patents 
with more IPC codes are less likely to be litigated (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; 
2004). Two possible interpretations explain this phenomenon. First, it is more difficult 
for patent holders to detect the imitation or infringement of patents of broader utility 
because most of the imitation or infringement may occur in some industries, which are 
beyond the patent holders’ detection (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). Second, 
patents with more IPC codes are more general and thus less immediately relevant for the 
market outcomes (Harhoff and Reitzig 2004). Therefore, it takes more time for these 
kinds of patents to be imitated and infringed. Many of them might expire before they 
are imitated and infringed. 
Family size  
Family size refers to the number of countries in which the patent right for the same 
invention has been applied for. Cremers (2004) found that family size has a positive 
effect on the probability of litigation for a given patent in Germany. Meanwhile, Chien 
(2011) also found that the number of foreign family members (foreign applications for 
the same invention) positively impacts the probability of litigation for a given patent in 
the US. As family size is well validated as a patent value indicator, patents with a larger 
family size are theoretically more likely to be infringed and litigated. 
The number of backward citations 
Backward citations are citations made to prior patents by patent examiners and/or 
inventors in the patent applications. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) found a 
significant and negative effect of the number of backward citations per claim on the 
probability of litigation for a given patent. They argued that a small number of 
backward citations indicates the patent belongs to a relatively new technology field and 
is full of uncertainty. This leads to the parties’ divergence in the outcome of the 
litigation and thus a higher probability of litigation. However, contrary to this finding, 
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Allison et al. (2003) found that litigated patents in the US tend to have more backward 
citations. This finding is further confirmed in Cremers’ study, which uses Germany 
patent cases. One possible interpretation for this is that as backward citations are usually 
similar to the citing patent, more backward citations indicate more competitors in the 
same technology field, which makes the patent more likely to be infringed, and thus 
have a higher probability of litigation. 
The number of domestic family members 
Patent applicants can file a continuing patent application based on a previously filed 
patent application (parent application) before it is abandoned or issued. In the US, three 
types of continuing patent applications (child application) are available for an applicant 
to cover new claims or even add new subject matter not disclosed in the parent 
application: a continuation application, a continuation-in-part application, and a 
divisional application. All these “parent” and “child” patent applications are called 
domestic family. Allison et al. (2003) found that the average number of domestic family 
members of the litigated patents is significantly more than that of a non-litigated patent. 
They argued that a continuation application and a continuation-in-part application may 
indicate the applicator’s desire to build a platform of related patents. Chien (2011) also 
found that the number of domestic family members for a given patent has a positive 
impact on its probability of being litigated. Chien argued that as filing a continuing 
application is costly, the larger number of domestic family members indicates the 
applicant’s higher expectation of the value of the patent. As valuable patents are more 
likely to be infringed, patents belonging to larger domestic family have a higher 
probability of litigation.  
Opposition 
The validity of a patent granted by some patent offices, such as the Europe Patent 
Office (EPO), the patent office in Germany, and the Japan Patent Office (JPO) can be 
challenged by any third party under the mechanism of opposition. Cremers (2004) 
analyzed a sample of German patent cases and found that patents that have ever been 
opposed are more likely to be litigated in their later lifetime. Cremers argued that 
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opposition to the grant of a patent indicates that the opposing party has the interest to 
use the invention, which may be because they have made a similar invention or the 
patented invention is so valuable that it is worthy to oppose and even infringe the patent. 
For this reason, patents that underwent opposition are more likely to be litigated. 
Prosecution length  
Allison et al. (2003) found that the time spent in prosecution is on average 
significantly longer for litigated patents than for issued patents. There are two possible 
interpretations for this. First, a long prosecution time indicates that the patent belongs to 
a crowded technology field and thus takes longer for the patent examiner to investigate 
prior arts (Osenga, 2012). This indicates that the patented inventions are mature and 
more relevant for the market outcomes. These kinds of patents are more likely to be 
litigated than general technologies. Second, a longer time in prosecution indicates the 
applicant’s greater effort on the quality of the patent right. This will make the patentee 
more confident in its enforceability and thus they will tend to litigate it instead of 
accepting a pretrial settlement.  
Patent age 
Allison et al. (2003) found that patents are more likely to be litigated when they are 
young. They argued that this is because the potential value of a patent is always found 
early in its lifetime. This explanation is supported by the fact that forward citations for a 
patent are usually made in its early lifetime. 
The number of forward citations 
Forward citations are citations received by a patent from later patent applications. 
The number of forward citations has been found to positively impact the probability of 
litigation for a given patent in many studies (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; 2004; 
Allison et al., 2003; Cremers, 2004; Chien, 2010). As the number of forward citations 
has been well verified and widely used as a patent value indicator (Trajtenberg, 1990; 
Albert et al., 1991; Harhoff et al., 1999; 2003; Yamada, 2010), one plausible 
interpretation for this is that patents with more forward citations have a higher 
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probability of infringement and thus are more likely to be involved in patent litigation. 
Other acquired characteristics of litigated patents 
Chien (2011) divided the characteristics of litigated patents into two categories: 
intrinsic characteristics and acquired characteristics. The former includes the 
characteristics that are acquired when or before the patent right is granted. Except for 
forward citations, all the characteristics noted above are intrinsic characteristics. After a 
patent right is granted, it will undergo many post-issuance “events,” such as change of 
ownership by patent transfer, post-issuance investment, patent collateralization, citation 
by later patent applications, and patent enforcement. Chien (2011) called these 
post-issuance events acquired characteristics. She constructed three variables relating to 
change of ownership (number of recorded assignments, recorded transfer, and change of 
owner size), two variables related to post-issuance investment (maintenance fees and ex 
parte reexamination), and two other variables (adjusted forward citations and patent 
collateralization). She found that all these variables positively impact the probability of 
litigation for a given patent.  
Patent portfolio size  
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) found that patents in a large patent portfolio are 
less likely to be litigated and this effect is even more significant for non-drug patents 
because being a part of a large patent portfolio is less important for drug patents than 
non-drug patents. Cremers (2004) confirmed this argument in Germany and found that 
with the increase of patent portfolio size, the negative effect becomes increasingly 
significant. One plausible interpretation is that a large patent portfolio is a good bargain 
chip for a patentee to negotiate with infringers. Therefore, firms with a large patent 
portfolio are more likely to reach a settlement than those with a small patent portfolio. 
Firm size 
Allison et al. (2003) found that the probability of litigation for patents originally 
issued to individuals and small businesses is significantly higher than that for those 
originally issued to large firms is. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) demonstrated that 
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patents owned by domestic individuals, unlisted companies, and small listed companies 
are more likely to be litigated than those owned by their large counterparts in the US. 
Bessen and Meurer (2005) affirmed that patent litigation rates for small firms are 
significantly higher than those for large firms are (42.5 suits per 1000 patents for small 
firms versus 10.7 suits per 1000 patents for large firms). There are two possible 
interpretations for these findings (Allison et al., 2003). First, patents issued to 
individuals or small firms may be more valuable than those issued to large firms are. As 
valuable patents have a higher probability of being infringed, patents issued to 
individuals or small firms are more likely to be litigated than those issued to large firms 
are. Second, individuals or small firms are less conservative about litigation because 
they usually have little to lose while large firms face a high risk of being countersued by 
defendants. Cremers (2004) also found that small firms are more likely to litigate their 
patent rights than larger firms in Germany. However, patents owned by firms are found 
to be more likely to be litigated than those owned by individuals in this study, which is 
contrary to the finding in the US. Cremers argued that this is because individuals in 
Germany are more pessimistic about the financial burden of patent litigation. 
Nationality 
Nationalities of patentees are found also to be an important factor that affects the 
probability of patent litigation. Domestic entities are found to be significantly more 
likely to litigate their patents than their foreign counterparts are (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001; 2004; Cremers, 2004; Allison, 2003). There are several possible 
interpretations for this finding. First, as it is more difficult for a foreign entity to detect 
infringement, foreign entities are less likely to be involved in patent disputes. Second, 
as it is costlier for foreign entities to file a patent infringement suit abroad than for their 
domestic counterparts, foreign entities preferably choose to resolve patent disputes by 
settlement instead of litigation. Third, as foreign entities may expect a lower probability 
of winning because of their disadvantage in evaluating the information, they have a 
lower propensity to litigate (Cremers, 2004). 
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Non-practicing entity 
A number of studies have demonstrated that NPEs have higher litigation rates than 
ordinary firms. Chien (2009) found that 17% of patent lawsuits in hardware, software, 
and financial inventions filed in the US between January 1st, 2000 and March 21st, 
2008 were sued by NPEs. Actually, the ratio of patent cases filed by NPEs in all the US 
patent cases has increased from 26% in 2008 to 69% in the US in 2015 (NPE Activity 
Highlights, 2012; 2015).  
1.3.3 The Benefits and Costs of patent litigation 
(1) The benefits of patent litigation 
Patent litigation has many benefits for patentees. First, patentees have the right to 
claim injunctions and damages if they win a patent infringement suit. Second, patent 
litigation can be used to deter potential infringement because launching an infringement 
lawsuit reflects a patentee’s willingness to assert its patent rights. Third, patent litigation 
can be strategically used to license patent rights. This has been widely used in the 
United States (US) by the so-called “patent trolls,” who aim to earn licensing fees rather 
than to get injunctions and damages through patent litigation. Fourth, patent litigation 
can be used to enhance the plaintiff’s reputation, especially for large public firms. 
Several previous studies have affirmed this argument. Marco (2005) analyzed stock 
market reactions to patent litigation decisions in the US and found that patent litigation 
leads to positive excess returns for patent holders if the litigated patent is ruled valid. 
Henry (2013) also found that patent litigation in the US leads to an increase in the 
plaintiff’s market value when its litigated patents are ruled valid and have been 
infringed upon. Raghu et al. (2008) examined market reactions to patent litigation using 
65 patent cases in the IT industry and found that patent litigation increases abnormal 
returns for plaintiff firms at both the announcement date and the settlement/termination 
date of patent litigation indicating that patent litigation enhances shareholder confidence 
in the future profits of the plaintiff firms. Schliessler (2015) found that, regardless of the 
outcome of patent litigation, being a plaintiff in patent litigation in Germany has a 
significantly positive impact on a firm’s credit rating. 
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 (2) The costs of patent litigation 
One of the most important parts of risk assessment is to assess the costs of the risk. 
As patent litigation usually lasts for several years, plaintiffs must be able to afford a 
large amount of direct and indirect costs of patent litigation. The direct costs include 
legal fees to the court and attorney fees to lawyers and patent attorneys. In addition, the 
plaintiff patentee faces the risk of the litigated being invalidated during patent litigation.  
On the other hand, the indirect costs of patent litigation include the significant time 
and manpower required for the lawsuit. Bessen and Meurer (2008) argued that business 
activities could be interrupted because managers and researchers must commit a 
considerable amount of time preparing for litigation and appearing in court. Moreover, 
Shane and Somaya (2007) found that patent litigation has an adverse effect on 
university licensing activities. They argued that this is because patent litigation disrupts 
the overall activities of technology licensing offices (TLOs) and reduces the time and 
resources available for TLO to market technologies and establish licenses. Moreover, 
cooperative relations between the two parties are destroyed by litigation. Some firms 
with weak fiscal capacities even face the danger of bankruptcy.  
1.4 Remaining Issues  
There are at least three limitations in the previous literature above. First, most of the 
prior literature studies patent litigation in the US. Empirical studies of patent litigation 
in the countries other than the US are just exceptions. As the patent and litigation 
systems, people’s attitudes toward litigation differ across countries, it is necessary to 
study and compare these issues between different countries. Second, patent litigation 
risk assessment should be evaluated not only at the patent level but also at the firm level. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, up until now, no empirical literature has studied 
the characteristics of patent litigation at the firm level. Third, up until now, the monetary 
benefits and costs of patent litigation have attracted most scholars’ attention and the 
impact of patent litigation on the parties’ business activities has not been studied 
extensively.  
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1.5 Research Questions 
1.5.1 The Effect of Patent Value on Patent Damage Awards 
First, although it is logical to expect that patent value has a significant effect on 
patent damage awards, up until now, no prior literature has systematically demonstrated 
this argument. Second, most of the prior literature studied patent damage awards in the 
US and to the best of my knowledge, only one of them studied the determinants of 
patent damage awards in China. In this dissertation, I compare the effect of patent value 
on patent damage awards between the US, Japan, and China from three perspectives: 
the technological importance, the private economic value for the patentee and the scope 
of a patent. In other words, I will answer the following two questions in Chapter 3: 
Q1: How do different aspects of patent value impact the patent damage award?  
Q2: Do these effects vary between the US, Japan, and China? 
1.5.2 The Characteristics of Patent Litigation 
Although the characteristics of litigated patents have been studied extensively in the 
US, they are seldom studied in other countries. The only exception studied a sample of 
German litigated patents. In this dissertation, I attempt to examine the applicability of 
the findings in the US in Japan and China. I will answer this question in Chapter 3: 
Q3: How do the characteristics of litigated patents vary across countries? 
In addition to the previously examined patent characteristics in the prior literature, I 
examine the effects of three new patent characteristics－the number of words or nouns 
in the first claim, asserting domestic priority, and the number of inventors－on the 
probability of litigation. I will mention this in detail in Section 4.1. In other words, in 
Chapter 4, I also attempt to answer the following three questions: 
Q4. Are patents with a shorter first independent claim more likely to be litigated? 
Q5. Are patents asserting domestic priority more likely to be litigated? 
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Q6. Are patents with more inventors more likely to be litigated? 
Furthermore, all the literature above studied the characteristics of patent litigation at 
the patent level. Compared with the characteristics of litigated patents, there are very 
few studies on the characteristics of patent litigants. Evidence on the characteristics of 
patent litigant (Characteristics 12-15 noted above) is mainly from descriptive statistics 
and the analysis results at the patent level. As predicting patent litigation at the firm 
level is also an important part of patent litigation risk assessment, I provide a direct 
study of the characteristics of patent litigation at the patent level. I will answer the 
following question in Chapter 5: 
Q7: Can the characteristics of the patent portfolio be used to predict the probability 
of patent litigation at the firm level? 
1.5.3 The Impact of Patent Litigation on the Plaintiff SMEs 
Although, as noted above, patentees can theoretically benefit from patent litigation in 
various ways, SMEs usually faces certain difficulties in acquiring these benefits. First, 
SMEs usually have little internal expertise to apply for strong patent rights, which have 
a broad scope to trap infringement and can stand validity challenges by others. Second, 
SMEs usually lack resources to detect and collect proof of infringement, which is 
important for successful litigation and for calculating patent damages. Third, unlike 
large firms, SMEs usually have limited financial capacities, so the high costs of patent 
litigation may be a heavy burden for them. For such firms, patent litigation may even 
adversely affect their reputation rather than enhance it because of possible bankruptcy 
risks (Bessen and Meurer, 2008). In brief, all these factors put SMEs at a disadvantage 
when trying to benefit from patent litigation. Even so, I still argue that patent litigation 
benefits plaintiff SMEs in some ways. As a patent litigant, plaintiff SMEs interact 
frequently with patent attorneys, patent lawyers, the judge, and the defendant during the 
period of patent litigation. They can learn plenty of explicit and tacit knowledge on how 
to use the patent system more effectively. Therefore, I examine whether patent litigation 
provides a chance for plaintiff SMEs to learn to apply for strong patents in Chapter 6.  
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To summarize, I attempt to answer the following questions in Chapter 6:  
Q8: Do the high costs of patent litigation negatively impact plaintiff SMEs’ patenting 
activities? 
Q9: Does patent litigation provide a good chance for plaintiff SMEs to learn to apply 
for strong patent rights?  
 
1.6 Some Relevant Facts 
Figure 2-1 displays some important events related to this research. I will discuss these 
in detail in the remainder of this section. 
Figure 2-1. Some important events relating to this research 
1.6.1 Patent Litigation in the US 
(1) The definition of patent rights in the US 
In the US, patent rights include the utility patent, plant patent, and design patent. The 
utility patent right in the US is the counterpart of the invention patent right and utility 
model (patent) right in China and Japan. 
  
US
2010        NPE activity
Japan China
1998        Amendment of calculation 
method of patent damages
2005       Establishment of Intellectual 
Property High Court
2014       Establishment of Intellectual 
Property Courts in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou
2009       Implementation of the third
version of Chinese Patent Law
2001       Join WTO
2011       The fourth amendment                 
to Chinese Patent Law started
1982        Establishment of US CAFC
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(2) Continuing patent application 
Patent applicants can file a continuing patent application based on a previously filed 
application (parent application) before it is abandoned or issued. In the US, three types 
of continuing patent applications are available to cover new claims or even add new 
subject matter not disclosed in the parent application. They are the continuation 
application, the continuation-in-part application, and the divisional application. A 
continuation application is usually filed by an applicant to pursue additional claims to 
the inventions disclosed in the parent application. Continuation-in-part applications are 
those allowing an applicant to add new subject matter not disclosed in the prior parent 
application. Divisional applications are usually filed if the patent applicant has required 
by the patent examiner to split the parent application into one or more divisional 
applications each claiming only a single invention. The former two only exist in the US, 
and the third is also available in Japan and China. 
(3) Methods of calculating patent damages in the US 
Section 284 of the Patent Act in the US provides the following framework for 
awarding patent damages: Upon finding for the claimant, the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than 
a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with 
interest and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by a jury, the 
court shall assess them. In either event, the court may increase the damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed. (Section 284 of the US Patent Act) 
This statute does not provide any specific methods for calculating patent damages, 
but in practice, the court uses the following two options: lost profits and a reasonable 
royalty. In some cases, a combination of the two methods is used in the same litigation 
(Love, 2009). If the infringement act is found willful, the court can enhance damages up 
to three times the amount found or assessed (treble damages). 
To recover lost profits, one must establish causation between the infringement acts 
and the damages. In the US, the Panduit test was established by the 6th Circuit to 
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determine “but for” causation (Frank and DeFranco, 2000). To pass the Panduit “but for” 
test, a patentee must establish the following four requirements: the market demand for 
the product covered by the litigated patent; the absence of non-infringement substitutes 
satisfying the demand in the market; the patentee’s manufacturing and marketing 
capacity to exploit the demand; and the amount of profits that the patentee would have 
made had infringement not occurred (Frank and DeFranco, 2000; Love, 2009).  
If a patentee cannot establish all the four requirements, a reasonable royalty will be 
awarded by the court. A reasonable royalty is an amount that the patentee would have 
earned if both the patentee and the infringer been willing and had tried to negotiate to 
license the patent at the beginning of the infringement (Love, 2009). In Georgia-Pacific 
Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp, the US District Court for the Southern District of 
New York summarized 15 factors that should be taken into consideration in a 
hypothetical negotiation analysis (Frank and DeFranco, 2000). These 15 factors are 
called the Georgia-Pacific test and are now the most commonly used standard for US 
courts to calculate a reasonable royalty. An alternative method of calculating a 
reasonable royalty is a method called the “analytical approach,” under which the 
infringer’s profits relating to the infringing product or process are apportioned between 
the patentee and the infringer (Opderbeck, 2009). 
(4) Jury system 
The jury system is a special system in the US that does not exist in Japan and China. 
In a jury trial of patent litigation, juries play an important role in deciding questions of 
fact, especially in deciding the issues on infringement and damages (Signore, 2001). An 
increasing number of patent suits have been decided by juries in the US since 2010 
(NPE Activity Highlights, 2012, 2015).  
(5) The establishment of US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) 
In the US, the U.S. CAFC was established early in 1982 as the only appellate-level 
court with the jurisdiction to hear patent appeals. Although it also has other jurisdictions, 
such as appeals from the United States International Trade Commission and appeals 
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from Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), CAFC is most well-known for its unique 
jurisdiction of appeals from all of the U.S. District Courts. It plays an important role in 
strengthening patent protection and promoting uniformity in the jurisdiction of patent 
litigation across all the states in the US.  
(6) NPE activities 
A significant characteristic of recent patent litigation in the US is that the number of 
patent cases filed by NPEs has drastically increased since 2010. NPE is a corporate 
patent enforcement entity that neither practices nor seeks to commercialize its patents 
(Chien, 2009). According to the 2015 NPE Activity Highlights, the ratio of patent cases 
filed by NPEs in all the patent cases in the US has increased from 35% in 2010 to 69% 
in 2015. However, it should be noted that NPEs are more widespread in the US than in 
other countries because of the special features of patent and litigation systems in the US, 
such as the high cost of litigation, cost allocation rules, high damage awards and treble 
damage system, the courts’ pro-patentee posture, low examination quality, and broad 
patentable subject matter (Harhoff, 2009). 
1.6.2 Patent Litigation in Japan 
(1) The definition of patent rights in Japan 
In Japan, patent rights, utility model rights, and design rights are three interdependent 
intellectual property rights. The patent right in Japan is the counterpart of the invention 
patent right in China. 
(2) Methods of calculating patent damages in Japan 
Before 1998, the Patent Act in Japan provided only two options for calculating patent 
damages: defendant’s profits and a reasonable royalty. To recover lost profits, one had 
to claim damages under Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code, which required 
stringent proof of causation between lost profits and the infringement act. However, 
because patent rights are intangible property, it is extremely difficult for one to do so. 
Therefore, to reduce the plaintiff party’s burden of proof, Japanese lawmakers revised 
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Article 102 of the Japanese Patent Act in 1998 by adding a new provision for 
calculating lost profits. This provision shifted the burden of proof largely to the 
defendant. Before 1998, the court usually determined reasonable royalties by referring 
to either of the patentee’s prior royalty rate for the litigated patent, the license royalty 
rates for government-owned patents, or industry-standard royalty rates (Takenaka, 
2000). In such cases, the infringer could simply afford the same or a smaller amount of 
money to the patentee even if it lost the litigation. This had no deterrent force to the 
alleged infringer or to other potential infringers. In other words, it gave them incentives 
not to apply for a license before infringing on others’ patent rights. Therefore, Japanese 
lawmakers amended Article 102-2 of the pre-1998 Patent Act in Japan by eliminating 
the word “normally” (tsujo) in 1998 and allowing the courts to consider the value of the 
litigated patent, the commercial relationship between two parties, defendant’s profits, 
and other related matters when determining a reasonable royalty. 
Article 102 of the current Patent Act in Japan provides three options for calculating 
patent damages: lost profits, defendant’s profits, and a reasonable royalty. Unlike in 
China which will be noted below, lost profits in Japan are calculated by multiplying a 
patentee’s own profit from a single product and the defendant’s quantity of sales of the 
infringing product instead of the plaintiff’s reduction in the patentee’s quantity of sales 
for the infringement. However, lost profits should never exceed the amount that can be 
attained by the patentee or exclusive licensee’s own capacity. Article 102 also provides 
that a patentee or exclusive licensee can claim more than a reasonable royalty but if the 
infringement is unintentional or not grossly negligent, the court may take these 
circumstances into consideration when determining patent damages. In practice, this 
provision confers the court discretion to limit damages to a reasonable royalty (Cotter, 
2013). Moreover, Article 105-3 provides that if “it is difficult for the court, due to the 
nature of the facts, to prove the facts necessary to determine the amount of damage, the 
court may determine a reasonable amount of damage based on the entire import of oral 
argument and the result of the examination of evidence.” 
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(3) The establishment of the Intellectual Property High court 
Before 2005, the first instances of patent litigations were mainly heard in the Tokyo 
District Court and Osaka District Court, and the second instances of patent litigations 
were heard in the Tokyo High Court and Osaka High Court. In 2005, the IP High Court 
was established to accelerate and reduce the costs of patent litigation in Japanese courts. 
Currently, the IP High Court is the only appellate-level court with the jurisdiction to 
hear appeals from district courts in Japan. As a part of Japan’s pro-patent policy, the 
establishment of the IP High Court played an important role in strengthening patent 
protection in Japan. 
(4) The technical investigation officer 
Unlike courts in other countries, Japanese courts attach great importance to 
determining questions of facts relating to technology. For this reason, technical experts 
have long been used to assist in hearing patent litigation in Japan (Matsuda, 2005). 
Technical experts are divided into two types: full-time technical investigation officers 
and part-time technical advisors. The former is those with both technical knowledge and 
the knowledge of the patent act, while the latter is those with specialized knowledge in 
some high technology fields. In principle, full-time technical investigation officers are 
indispensable for patent litigation while part-time advisors attend patent litigation when 
necessary. 
1.6.3 Patent Litigation in China 
(1) The definition of patent rights in China 
In China, patent rights include invention patent rights, utility model patent rights, and 
design patent rights.  
(2) Methods of calculating patent damages in China 
Since being enacted in 1984, the Patent Law in China has been amended three times, in 
1992, in 2000, and 2008, respectively. The pre-2000 Patent Law did not provide any 
specific method of calculating patent damages, and most of the patent disputes at that 
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time were resolved by administrative enforcement instead of patent litigation.  
The post-2000 Patent Law provided three options for calculating patent damages: lost 
profits, defendant’s profits, and a reasonable royalty. While it provided that lost profits 
and defendant’s profits were the preferred methods for calculating patent damages, no 
preference was given. A reasonable royalty was an appropriate multiple, usually one to 
three times the prior royalty rate of the litigated patent. The Patent Law was amended in 
2008 and went into effect on October, 1st, 2009. It provides four options for determining 
patent damages: lost profits, defendant’s profits, a reasonable royalty, and statutory 
compensation. In principle, the court should select a method in the following descending 
order of preference: lost profits, defendant’s profits, a reasonable royalty and statutory 
compensation. In other words, statutory compensation should function as an alternative 
method when patent damages cannot be calculated with any of the other three methods. 
However, in practice, more than 90% of patent litigations in China has been awarded 
statutory damages. Actually, although statutory compensation is not provided in the 
post-2000 Patent Law, courts in China had awarded statutory damages on their own 
authority and later, pursuant to Article 21 of Patent Trial Guidelines for several years 
before the post-2008 Patent Act went into effect in 2009 (Cotter, 2013). At that time, 
statutory compensation was restricted to the range of RMB 5, 000 yuan to RMB 30, 000 
yuan and should never exceed RMB 500, 000 yuan. Currently, statutory compensation 
has been stipulated in the current Patent Law, and its upper and lower limits have 
doubled to 1, 000, 000 yuan and 10, 000 yuan, respectively. As mentioned below, the 
lower limits of statutory compensation will be furtherly increased in the fourth 
amendment of the Patent Law in China. 
(3) The establishment of the intellectual property courts  
In China, three IP courts were established in the three most developed cities in China 
(Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou) in 2014. Unlike those in the US and Japan, IP 
courts in China are for the first instance of patent litigation and have no jurisdiction to 
hear appeals of patent litigation. Like courts in Japan, technical investigation officers 
must attend patent litigation in IP courts. The establishment of IP courts also suggests 
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that the Chinese government is attempting to strengthen patent protection in China. 
 (4) The fourth amendments to the Chinese Patent Law 
Since 2011, the Chinese Patent Law has been undergoing the fourth amendment. The 
main aim of this amendment is to strengthen patent protection in China. The lower 
limits of statutory compensation will be greatly increased and punitive compensation 
will also be introduced. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The following chapter 
describes the research design. Chapter 3 provides a comparative study of the effects of 
different aspects of patent value on patent damage awards between the US, Japan, and 
China and answers questions 1 and 2. Chapter 4 provides a comparative study of the 
characteristics of litigated patents between the US, Japan, and China and answers 
questions 3-6. Chapter 5 studies the characteristics of Japanese patent litigation at the 
firm level and answers question 7. Chapter 6 presents an empirical study of the effect of 
patent litigation on subsequent patenting behaviors of the plaintiff SMEs in Japan and 
answers questions 8 and 9. Finally, Chapter 7 presents the conclusions, implications, 
and future research. 
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Chapter 2 Research Design  
2.1 Research Objectives 
2.1.1 The Definition of Patent Litigation 
Two things should be noted about patent litigation in this dissertation. First, as noted 
above, the definition of patent rights differs across countries. As invention patents are 
usually of higher value than other types of patent rights, invention patent litigation in 
China, patent litigation in Japan, and utility patent litigation in the US are used in this 
dissertation. Second, unlike in Japan and China, where the validity of a patent right is 
decided by the patent office, any third party can file a suit to challenge the validity of 
other patentees’ patent rights in court in the US. To ensure the same definition of patent 
litigation for samples from the US, Japan, and China, I excluded patent challenge suits 
from the analysis and only used patent infringement suits for the analyses. In other 
words, the plaintiffs in the sample of this study are patent holders or exclusive licensees 
and the defendants are alleged infringers. 
2.1.2 The Definition of Patent Litigation Risk 
Patent litigation risk can be defined from two different perspectives. From the 
perspective of a patentee, patent litigation risk is the risk of being involved in patent 
litigation as a plaintiff (patent litigant). From the perspective of a potential infringer, 
patent litigation risk is the risk of being involved in patent litigation as a defendant 
(alleged infringer). Because research design will differ greatly by the definition assumed 
for patent litigation risk, I have designed the research and interpreted the findings from 
the perspective of a patentee in this dissertation, though the findings in Chapter 3 and 4 
are also useful in the assessment of the risk of being sued as an alleged infringer.  
As noted above, NPE is a special type of patent litigants that neither practice nor seek 
to commercialize its patents. As NPEs usually file patent litigation with the intention of 
licensing their patents, patent litigation serves more as an opportunity for profit than a 
risk for them. On the other hand, it is also logical to believe that patent litigation filed 
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by NPEs may have different characteristics from that filed by innovators. Therefore, 
patent litigation filed by NPEs should be studied separately from that filed by 
innovators. Therefore, in the dissertation, I focus on the innovators’ patent litigation and 
exclude patent litigation filed by NPEs from the analyses to the extent possible.  
2.2 Data Collection 
2.2.1 Data Sources 
The US patent litigation data were collected from the database WestlawNext. The 
Japanese litigation data were collected from the IP litigation database provided by the 
Supreme Court of Japan. The Chinese litigation data were collected mainly from the 
database Pkulaw provided by Beijing Beidayinghua Technology Co., Ltd and partly 
from the website of the China Supreme People’s Court (http://ipr.court.gov.cn/zgrmfy/).  
Patent data are mainly collected from the patent database PatentSQUARE provided 
by Panasonic Solution Technologies Co., Ltd. Exceptionally, the number of claims for 
Chinese patents were manually investigated in Google Patent Search.  
2.2.2 Data Extraction Intervals 
Because the patent system and patentees’ propensity for patenting and litigating their 
patent rights change over time, recent data are more appropriate for this study. Therefore, 
I planned to extract patent cases whose rulings were decided between 2000 and 2014. 
However, the data extraction intervals for some of the analyses in this dissertation 
actually differ from this setting for various reasons. 
As patent cases filed by NPEs has begun to increase drastically in the US since 2010 
(NPE activity highlights, 2012, 2015), I tried to use patent cases filed before 2010 for 
the analyses in the US. However, in Chapter 3, to ensure a sufficient sample size, I 
extended the decision year of extracted patent cases to 2012 and excluded those filed 
after 2010 from the extracted sample. In addition, in Chapter 4, although patent cases 
ruled after 2009 also contain patent cases filed before 2010, patent cases decided during 
the period from 2000 to 2009 were sufficient for the study. Therefore, I only extracted 
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patent cases decided from 2000 to 2009 for the analysis in Chapter 4.  
For Chinese samples, since only a few patent litigation decisions in the earlier years 
were available in the Beidafabao Database, I only managed to collect patent cases 
decided from 2003 and 2014 for the analysis in Chapter 3. And only one patent case 
decided in 2000 and no patent case decided in 2001 for the analysis in Chapter 4. In any 
case, in view of the drastic change in patent protection strength in China, a sample with 
more patent cases decided in recent years may be more appropriate for this study.  
For Japanese samples, the patents used for the analyses were those filed before 2011 
to ensure relatively stable forward citation data, since it takes time for patents to be cited. 
For this reason, in chapters 3 and 4, I used all the patent cases decided from 2000 and 
2014 in which the patents involved were mainly filed before 2011, while patent cases 
used in Chapter 5 were those with rulings between 2000 and 2010, and the patent cases 
used in Chapter 5 were those with rulings from between 2000 and 2008.  
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Chapter 3 The Effect of Patent Value on Patent Damage Awards 
3.1 Research Questions 
Patent damage awards are commonly regarded as a monetary manifestation of patent 
value. Therefore, it is logical to expect that patents of higher value will be awarded 
higher patent damages. However, as noted in Section 1.5.1, up until now, the effect of 
patent value on patent damage awards has not been extensively investigated, especially 
in Japan and China. Therefore, I examine the effects of the most commonly examined 
three patent value indicators－the number of forward citations, patent family size, and 
patent scope－on patent damage awards in the US, Japan, and China. In other words, I 
attempt to answer the first two research questions noted in Section 1.5.1: 
Q1: How do different aspects of patent value impact patent damage awards? 
Q2: Do these effects vary among the US, Japan, and China? 
3.1.1 Forward Citations 
The value of a patent should depend on its technological importance. In this chapter, I 
use the number of forward citations as the indicator for the technological importance of 
a patent. The correlation between the number of forward citations and patent value has 
also been extensively demonstrated in prior literature (Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et al. 
(1999, 2003; Yamada 2010; Fischer and Leidinger, 2014). Theoretically, a large number 
of forward citations indicate that the patented invention contributes greatly to the 
development of later innovations. Albert et al. (1990) validated this argument directly 
by showing a strong positive correlation between the citation rate of a patent and its 
technological importance evaluated by knowledgeable researchers and inventors. 
Trajtenberg et al. (1997) found that university patents, which are usually basic 
inventions, are cited more than corporate patents. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) found that 
“wacky” patents, which do not involve a high inventive step or only marginally satisfy 
the “non-obviousness” criterion, have fewer forward citations than ordinary patents. All 
these findings suggest that the number of forward citations could function as a good 
predictor of the technological importance of a patented invention.  
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3.1.2 Patent Family Size 
Unlike the number of forward citations, patent family size indicates the private 
economic value of a patent for the patentees. Generally, it is significantly costlier in terms 
of time, effort, and money to file a patent application in foreign countries. Hence, 
patentees file an international patent application only when they expect that the returns 
from the patent in that country is higher than the filing costs (Martínez, 2011). As a result, 
a larger patent family size indicates the applicant’s expectation of a return from the 
patented technology (Nagaoka et al., 2010). Prior literature has found some compelling 
empirical evidence to support this argument. Harhoff et al. (2003) found that patent 
family size is significantly associated with the private economic value of a patent as 
estimated by the patent holder. Fischer and Leidinger (2014) also demonstrated the 
validity of patent family size as an indicator of the private economic value of a patent by 
showing the correlation between the family size of a patent and its patent auction price.  
3.1.3 Patent Scope 
A third aspect of patent value is the scope of a patent. Theoretically, a patent with a 
broader scope could be used in many products or processes and hence has higher value. 
Furthermore, it is more difficult for a competitor to invent around a broader patent, which 
enhances the exclusive value of patent rights for the potent holder (Fischer and Leidinger, 
2014). In this chapter, I use the number of 4-digit IPC subclasses as an indicator of patent 
scope put forth this approach by Lerner (1994). Lerner (1994) found that the number of 
4-digit IPC subclasses positively affects the value of startup firms in the biotechnology 
industry. Since that, the number of 4-digit IPC subclasses has been widely used in many 
later studies (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1998; Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). However, it 
should be admitted that many recent studies fail to found a significant correlation 
between the number of 4-digit IPC subclasses and the patent value (Harhoff et al., 2003; 
Yamada, 2010; Fischer and Leidinger, 2014). Therefore, I also use the number of 9-digit 
IPC codes to check the robustness of the findings based on IPC codes in this chapter. 
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3.2 Datasets and Variables 
3.2.1 Data Description 
Based on a careful reading of the decisions of patent infringement suits, I identified 
161 damage-awarding patent cases that were filed before 2010 and decided by US 
courts between 2000 and 2012. From them, I collected 242 damage-awarded patents, of 
which 145 were ruled by judges and 97 were ruled by juries. In addition, I extracted 123 
damage-awarding patent cases decided by Japanese courts between 2000 and 2014. 
From them, I collected 131 damage-awarded patents. Furthermore, I extracted 505 
damage-awarding patent cases decided by Chinese courts between 2000 and 2014. I 
identified 507 damage-awarded patents in these patent cases. 
Figure 3-1 displays the distributions of these patent cases by decision year. The most 
notable thing is that most of the patent cases in China are those decided in recent years 
after 2008. As noted in Section 2.2.2, in view of the drastic change in patent protection 
strength in China, a sample with more patent cases decided in recent years may be more 
appropriate for this study.  
Figure 3-1. The Distributions of Patent Cases by Decision Year. 
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In addition, patent litigations in the US lasted significantly longer than those in Japan 
and China do. In the US, patent cases lasted for 4.1 years on average, and 47.8% lasted 
for more than 4 years. In Japan, patent cases lasted for 2.5 years on average, and 56.5 % 
of them were decided before the end of the second year after the filing year. In China, 
patent cases last for 1.0 year on average, and 84.0% of them were decided before the 
end of the first year after the filing year. Furthermore, although about 30% of the patent 
cases in all the three countries are appealed to a higher court (28% in the US, 32.1% in 
Japan, and 33.7% in China), patent damage awards are amended by the higher court at 
the highest rate in Japan (66.7% in Japan, 29.4% in the US, 18.8% in China). 
Figure 3-2 shows the distributions of technology fields of the litigated patents by the 
first letter of the principal IPC code assigned by patent examiner when issued. In the US, 
45.5% of the litigated patents ruled by US judges are from Technology Fields B and G, 
and 57.7% of those ruled by US juries are from Technology Fields A and G. In Japan, 
50.4% of the litigated patents are from Technology Fields A and B. In China, 48% of the 
litigated patents are from Technology Fields B and E.  
Figure 3-2. The Distributions of Technology Fields of the Litigated Patents 
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data-refining processes on patent damage awards. First, I removed lawyer and attorney 
costs from patent damage awards if they are awarded and written clearly in the decision 
because they are not directly related to the damages resulting from infringement. 
Second, this study is based on each litigated patent instead of each patent case. So, I 
ascertain patent damages for each litigated patent by reading the decision carefully if the 
patent case involves more than one patent. In cases where the patent damage award for 
each patent is not written clearly, I calculated them simply by dividing the total patent 
damages by the number of the litigated patents that were judged to be infringements. 
Third, according to the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, the court in Japan does not 
award the plaintiff party more than the amount claimed. Therefore, I use the calculated 
damages as patent damages instead of the actual awards if the calculated damages are 
over the plaintiff’s claims. Fourth, for patent cases that were appealed to higher courts, if 
patent damage awards are amended in the higher courts, the amended patent damage 
awards are used in the analyses. Fifth, to eliminate the effect of inflation on patent 
damage awards, I converted all patent damages to 2010 US dollars (for the US cases), 
2010 Japanese yen (for Japanese cases), and 2010 Chinese yuan (for Chinese cases) with 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Finally, as patent damage awards in the US, Japan, and 
China all obay a lognormal distribution, I use the natural logarithm of patent damage 
awards as the dependent variables. 
To make a comparison of patent damage awards among the US, Japan, and China, I 
adjusted Japanese and Chinese patent damage awards to US dollars with purchasing 
power parity (PPP) and later to 2010 US dollars with the CPI of the US dollar. Table 3-1 
shows some detailed statistical quantities of patent damage awards in the three countries. 
Differences in patent damage awards among the US, Japan, and China increase from the 
first quartile to the third quartile. The first quartile of US patent damage awards is more 
than those of Japanese and Chinese patent damage awards by only one digit. When it 
comes to the third quartile, US patent damage awards is more than Japanese patent 
damage awards by two digits and more than Chinese patent damage award by three digits. 
It can be inferred that compared with US courts, Japanese and especially Chinese courts 
tend not to award high patent damages. 
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Table 3-1. Comparison of Patent Damage Awards (2010 US dollars). 
Nation Minimum First quartile Median Third quartile Maximum Mean S.D. Obs. 
US 1, 873  500, 000  3, 196, 139  13, 608, 450  575, 283, 461  18, 879,257  58, 361, 793  242 
Japan 44  27, 201  170, 429  806, 029  22, 068, 481  1, 282, 778  3, 266, 108  131 
China 1, 292  15, 838  31, 515  65, 425  1, 500, 150  67, 825  128, 387  507 
 
3.2.3 Independent Variables 
The number of forward citations. The number of forward citations is the number of 
citations that a patent received. It should be noted that there are two problems with the 
use of the raw number of forward citations. First, forward citations face a truncation 
problem. In other words, older patents are more likely to receive more citations than 
younger patents. Second, patent application counts and citation rates may change greatly 
across years and technology fields. Therefore, Hall et al. (2001) proposed a fixed-effect 
approach to eliminate these issues. With this approach, the number of forward citations is 
normalized by dividing the raw number of forward citations by the average number of 
forward citations received by patents applied for in the same year and technology field 
(based on 4-digit IPC code). This variable is not used for Chinese patent damage awards 
because forward citation data are unavailable for Chinese patents. 
Patent family size. Patent family size refers to the number of jurisdictions in which 
patent protection for the same invention has been sought. 
The number of IPC codes. Both the number of 4-digit IPC subclasses and the 
number of 9-digit IPC codes assigned when issued are used in the regression models. 
3.2.4 Control Variables 
Age of litigated patent. Older patents may have been infringed for a longer time. In 
this study, patent age is calculated in years by subtracting the year of patent application 
from the filing year of the lawsuit. 
Willfulness dummy. If an act of infringement is considered to be willful, the court in 
the US can enhance damages up to three times of the actual amount found or assessed. 
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Therefore, I add a willfulness dummy in the regression models of US patent damage 
awards. If enhanced damages are awarded in a patent case, the willfulness dummy takes 
the value of 1, and otherwise, it takes 0. 
The number of claims. Patents with more claims are usually costlier in both the 
patent application and patent renewal stages. Theoretically, the number of claims can be 
an indicator of patent value, but this argument lacks adequate empirical evidence 
(Reitzig, 2004). On the other hand, the larger the number of claims, the better the patent 
is protected. Therefore, the number of claims is probably more appropriate as an 
indicator of patent quality. 
The number of lawyers and the number of patent attorneys. Efforts of the plaintiff 
and the defendant may influence patent damage awards. I use the number of the 
plaintiff’s lawyers, the number of the plaintiff’s patent attorneys, the number of the 
defendant’s lawyers, and the number of the defendant’s patent attorneys to control these 
effects in the analyses of Japanese and Chinese patent damage awards. For the US 
patent cases, I cannot make a distinction between lawyers and patent attorneys 
according to the decision, so I use the total number of lawyers and patent attorneys. 
Year dummies. The court’s propensity to award high patent damages may vary across 
different years. Therefore, I use year dummies to control for this effect. Year dummies are 
defined by the decision year. 
Technology dummies. Innovations in different technology fields may differ greatly in 
market size. Technology dummies are also used to control for this effect. Technology 
dummies are defined by the section symbol of the first IPC code assigned when granted. 
Court dummies. Court dummies are also added in the models to control the effect of 
court. In the regression of Chinese patent damage awards, I define court dummies by 
administrative area because the courts in the same administrative area probably take the 
same approach when awarding patent damages. 
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3.2.5 Analytical method 
As patent damage awards in this study obey a lognormal distribution, I use an 
ordinary least square (OLS) model to do the regression. 
3.3 Empirical results 
I examine correlations between variables before doing regression analyses and find 
that the number of plaintiff’s lawyers and attorneys is highly correlated with the number 
of the defendant’s lawyers and attorneys in the datasets of US patent damage awards 
(Appendices 1-2). To avoid the multicollinearity problem, I remove the number of the 
plaintiff’s lawyers and attorneys from the analyses of US patent damage awards. 
Correlations between variables in Japan and China are either insignificant or significant 
but quite low. Descriptive statistics of the variables are displayed in Appendices 4-6. 
As noted above, both the number of 9-digit IPC codes and the number of 4-digit IPC 
codes are tested in this study. In all the analyses, Models 1 and 2 use the number of 
9-digit IPC codes and the number of 4-digit IPC subclasses respectively. 
Table 3-2. OLS Regression Results for the Log_Japanese Patent Damage Awards 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Intercept 12.903*** (1.719)  12.805*** (1.743)  
Number of forward citations 0.207*** (0.075)  0.206*** (0.075)  
Family size 0.041 (0.075)  0.048 (0.073)  
Number of IPC codes 0.061 (0.129)  0.150 (0.305)  
Age of the litigated patent 0.081** (0.040)  0.081** (0.040)  
Number of claims  0.009 (0.056)  0.006 (0.058)  
Number of plaintiff's lawyers 0.001 (0.134)  −0.005 (0.132)  
Number of plaintiff's attorneys 0.206 (0.197)  0.204 (0.196)  
Number of defendant's lawyers −0.067 (0.109)  −0.061 (0.109)  
Number of defendant's attorneys 0.781*** (0.203)  0.790*** (0.205)  
Court dummies Yes  Yes  
Technological dummies Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  
R2 0.469  0.469  
Adjusted R2 0.273  0.273  
Observations  131  131  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
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Table 3-2 shows the regression results of Japanese patent damage awards. The 
number of forward citations significantly positively impacts patent damage awards. 
However, the coefficients for family size and the number of IPC codes are insignificant 
in both models. Moreover, the age of the litigated patent significantly positively impacts 
patent damage awards. The coefficients for the number of the defendant’s patent 
attorneys is significant and positive. However, this is probably due to selection bias. 
Patent litigations with higher stakes will encourage the defendant to make more efforts 
to defend themselves, such as to employ a greater number of patent attorneys. 
 
Table 3-3 shows the regression results of Chinese patent damage awards. The 
coefficients for family size is significant and positive in both models, and the coefficient 
for and the number of IPC codes is also significant and positive in Model 1, which uses 
9-digit IPC codes, but is insignificant in Model 2, which uses 4-digit IPC subclasses. 
Moreover, as in Japan, the coefficient for the number of the defendant’s attorneys is also 
significant and positive, which is probably due to selection bias. 
Table 3-3. OLS Regression Results for Log_Chinese Patent Damage Awards 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Intercept 11.519*** (0.281)  11.961*** (0.291)  
Family size 0.022** (0.009)  0.020** (0.009)  
Number of IPC codes 0.070** (0.034)  −0.106 (0.066)  
Age of the litigated patent −0.008 (0.013)  −0.010 (0.013)  
Number of claims  0.003 (0.004)  0.002 (0.004)  
Number of plaintiff's lawyers 0.032 (0.063)  0.042 (0.064)  
Number of plaintiff's attorneys −0.046 (0.124)  −0.039 (0.124)  
Number of defendant's lawyers 0.084 (0.056)  0.091 (0.056)  
Number of defendant's attorneys 0.326** (0.163)  0.324** (0.163)  
Court dummies Yes  Yes  
Technological dummies Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes 
R2 0.224  0.220 
Adjusted R2 0.173  0.170 
Observations  507  507 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p＜0.01, ** p＜0.05, * p＜0.1 
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Table 3-4 displays the regression results of US patent damage awards ruled by court 
judges. Contrary to the regression results of Japanese patent damage awards, the 
coefficients for both family size and the number of IPC codes (either 9-digit or 4-digit) is 
significant and positive, but the coefficient for the number of forward citations is 
insignificant. Moreover, as in Japan, the coefficient for the age of the litigated patent is 
significant and positive. The coefficient for the number of the defendant’s lawyers and 
patent attorneys is significant and positive in both models, which is probably due to 
selection bias. In fact, the coefficient is also significant and positive if the coefficient for 
the plaintiff’s lawyers and patent attorneys is used in the models. 
Table 3-4. OLS Regression Results for Log_US Patent Damage Awards Ruled by Court Judges 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Intercept 9.375*** (1.075)  9.063*** (1.073)  
Forward citations −0.061 (0.039)  −0.046 (0.038)  
Family size 0.067** (0.028)  0.060** (0.027)  
Number of IPC codes 0.444** (0.181)  0.897*** (0.300)  
Age of the litigated patent 0.119*** (0.033)  0.110*** (0.033)  
Number of claims  0.004 (0.007)  0.002 (0.007)  
Defendant's lawyers and attorneys 0.252*** (0.055)  0.244*** (0.054)  
Willfulness dummy 0.448 (0.333)  0.536 (0.327)  
Court dummies Yes  Yes  
Technological dummies Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  
R2 0.585  0.595  
Adjusted R2 0.475  0.488  
Observations  145  145  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p＜0.01, ** p＜0.05, * p＜0.1 
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Table 3-5 displays the regression results of US patent damage awards ruled by juries. 
None of the three patent value indicators are significantly associated with patent damage 
awards ruled by juries. The adjusted coefficient of determination is significantly lower 
than that of the regression of US patent damage awards ruled by court judges. Moreover, 
like the regression of patent damage awards ruled by court judges, the coefficient for the 
defendant’s lawyers and patent attorneys is also significant and positive, which is 
probably due to selection bias. The coefficient for the willfulness dummy is significant 
and positive in both models. 
Table 3-5. OLS Regression Results for Log_US Patent Damage Awards Ruled by Juries 
 Model 1  Model 2  
Intercept 14.181*** (1.504)  14.238*** (1.541)  
Forward citations 0.084 (0.063)  0.085 (0.064)  
Family size 0.016 (0.037)  0.017 (0.037)  
Number of IPC codes 0.051 (0.050)  0.051 (0.050)  
Age of the litigated patent −0.125 (0.410)  −0.205 (0.668)  
Number of claims  −0.002 (0.013)  −0.002 (0.013)  
Defendant's lawyers and attorneys 0.169** (0.063)  0.169*** (0.063)  
Willfulness dummy 1.290** (0.545)  1.307** (0.544)  
Court dummies Yes  Yes  
Technological dummies Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  
R2 0.503  0.503  
Adjusted R2 0.288  0.288  
Observations  97  97  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p＜0.01, ** p＜0.05, * p＜0.1 
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3.4 Discussion 
(1) The Different Effect Patterns of Patent Value across Countries 
As a well-established indicator of the technological importance of a patent, the 
correlation between the number of forward citations and the patent value has been 
extensively demonstrated in precious literature. Therefore, patents with more forward 
citations are expected to be awarded higher patent damages in court. However, the 
regression results show that it is true only in Japan and no significant effect is found in 
the US. One plausible interpretation is that in comparison with the courts in the US, the 
courts in Japan attach more weight to the technological quality of the litigated patent. 
This interpretation has sound foundations. In the US, patent litigation is heard by court 
judges and/or juries. The former are generalists but usually lack technological 
knowledge and the latter are even less knowledgeable with respect to both the US 
Patent Act and technologies. In contrast, in Japan, court judges of patent litigation are 
usually generalists and knowledgeable in a specific technology field. In addition, as 
noted in Section 1.6.2, technical experts have long been used in Japanese patent cases. 
Each patent case involves full–time technical investigation officers and some cases may 
further involve technology advisors who are knowledgeable in high technology fields. 
In contrast, in the US, although based on case law, technology advisors could also be 
used to support a patent trial, they are seldom employed in practice. Even if technology 
advisors are employed, the court in the US does not attach enough weight to their 
technological advice. These differences in the judicial systems will probably lead to a 
situation where the courts in Japan attach great weight to the technological importance 
of the patent while the courts in the US do not do so. For this reason, a significant 
correlation between the number of forward citations and patent damage awards is found 
in Japan, but not in the US. 
On the other hand, as noted in Section 3.1.1, patent family size is a well-established 
indicator of the private economic value of a patent for the patent holder and the number 
of IPC codes is an indicator of patent scope, which is related to the utility breadth and 
the excludability of a patent. Compared with technological importance of a patented 
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invention, both these two aspects of patent value are relatively easy for court judges to 
understand. Therefore, in the US and China, where court judges are generalists and 
technology experts are not or seldom employed in patent litigation, the courts attach 
weight to them since court judges can sufficiently understand them. For this reason, 
patent family size and the number of IPC codes have a significant effect on patent 
damage awards in the US and China. In contrast, due to the participation of 
technological experts, the courts in Japan attach too much weight toward the 
technological importance of a patent and neglect the aspects of patent value indicated by 
patent family size and the number of IPC codes. 
(2) The Different Effect Patterns of Patent Value between US judges and US juries 
Although no significant effect is found for the number of forward citations, patent 
family size and the number of IPC codes have a significant effect on patent damage 
awards ruled by court judges in the US. In contrast, none of the three aspects of patent 
value have a significant effect on patent damage awards ruled by juries. One plausible 
interpretation for this difference is that juries do not have the competencies to hear 
complex patent litigations. Modern patent cases are so complex that juries struggle to 
understand them and accurately apply the law (Wilson, 1997). Some commentators even 
suggest that the Seventh Amendment should be invoked to eliminate juries from patent 
cases in which the complexity of facts or the underlying issues are too difficult for juries 
to understand (Miller, 2004). This argument is further supported by the fact that the 
coefficient of determination (0.288) in Table 3-5 is significantly lower than that in Table 
3-4 (0.475/0.488), which indicates that patent damage awards by juries are significantly 
less predictable than those ruled by court judges. 
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Chapter 4 The Characteristics of Litigated Patents 
4.1 Research Questions 
Predicting the probability of litigation for a given patent is important for patent 
litigation risk assessment. Incapable of distinguishing patents of a high probability of 
litigation from those of a low probability of litigation, patent holders will find it difficult 
to make sound resource allocations for detecting infringements and preparing for patent 
litigation. However, as noted in Section 1.4, up until now, as prior studies on the 
characteristics of litigated patents mainly used the US patent cases, it is necessary to 
examine the characteristics of the litigated patents in other countries. Up until now, the 
characteristics of litigated patents in Japan and China have never been empirically studied. 
Therefore, I attempt to examine whether the prior findings in the US are applicable in 
Japan and China. The first research question in this chapter is: 
Q3: Are the findings on the characteristics of patent litigations in the US applicable 
in Japan and China？ 
 
In addition to the previously examined patent characteristics in the prior literature, I 
examine the effects of three new patent characteristics on the probability of litigation.  
First, theoretically, patents with a broader scope can trap infringement more easily and 
thus are more likely to be litigated. In this dissertation, I use the number of words or 
nouns in the first independent claim in a patent as the indicator of patent scope which was 
well established and used in several prior studies (Malackowski and Barney, 2008; Meeks 
and Eldering, 2010; Dang and Motohashi, 2015). The theory for this indicator is that the 
length of a claim in a patent indicates the number of limitations in the claim and thus can 
serve as a measurement of its scope. The second research questions in this chapter is: 
Q4. Are patents with a shorter first independent claim more likely to be litigated? 
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Second, although patent systems are different across countries, mechanisms for patent 
applicants to add new subject matters to a previously filed patent application exists in 
either of the US, Japan, and China. In Japan and China, a patent applicant can add new 
subject matters by filing a new patent application claiming domestic priority to one or 
several previously filed patent applications. In the US, a patent applicant can add new 
subject matters to a previously filed patent application by filing a continuation-in-part 
application. All these mechanisms can be strategically used by patent applicants to make 
the patent application easier to trap competitors’ newly launched products and/or newly 
developed technologies. Even if they are not strategically used by patent applicants, the 
more efforts devoted to these patents also indicate that they are more valuable than 
ordinary patents. Therefore, patents applied for in these forms are expected to have a 
higher probability of litigation. The third research questions in this chapter is: 
Q5. Are patents asserting domestic priority more likely to be litigated? 
 
Third, theoretically, patents with more inventors are more likely to be valuable patents. 
First, a large number of inventors indicate that large resources have been invested in the 
development of the patented technology (OECD Patent Statistics Manual, 2009). Second, 
a large number of inventors indicate that the patented invention is a result of diverse 
knowledge. Nagaoka and Owan (2011) demonstrated this argument by finding that the 
size of an inventor team is significantly positively correlated with patent value. As 
valuable patents usually involve higher stakes, patents with more inventors are expected 
to be more likely to be litigated. Therefore, the fourth research question in this chapter is: 
Q6. Are patents with more inventors more likely to be litigated? 
4.2 Research Method 
4.2.1 Data Description 
I extracted US patent cases decided during the period from 2000 to 2009 to exclude 
patent cases filed by NPE as much as I could. After screening the patent infringement 
suits decided between 2000 and 2009, I found 2,825 US patent infringement cases with 
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3,850 individual patents involved. However, five of the litigated patents are so old that 
they are not collected in the PatentSQUARE patent database. Besides, five other patents 
are in technology fields where only one granted patent applied in the same year exists. 
For these five patents, I cannot assign non-litigated control patents to them. Therefore, I 
removed these 10 patents and finally obtained 3,840 litigated patents in the US. 
I collected 671 patent infringement suits decided between 2000 and 2014, with 703 
individual patents involved. I further removed five litigated patents with only 
inadequate patent data and finally obtained 698 litigated patents in Japan. 
In addition, I collected 970 Chinese patent cases decided between 2000 and 2014, 
which involved 602 individual patents in total. Four of them were applied in technology 
fields where only one granted patent applied in the same year exists. For the same 
reason noted above, I cannot assign non-litigated control patents to them. Therefore, I 
removed them from the analysis and obtained 598 Chinese litigated patents.  
Figure 4-1 shows the distributions of technology fields of the litigated patents in 
Japan, China, and the US. More than half of the litigated patents in Japan are from the 
technology fields A, B, and G. More than half of the litigated patents in China are from 
the technology fields B, A, and E. More than half of the litigated patents in the US are 
from the technology fields A and G. 
Figure 4-1. The Distributions of Technology Fields of the Litigated Patents in this chapter 
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4.2.2 Control Group Sampling 
To identify the characteristics of litigated patents, I assigned a non-litigated control 
patent to each litigated patent randomly from the set of granted patents applied for in the 
same year and technology field (4-digit IPC codes). With this method, the effect of the 
application year and technology field are controlled for. I also did my best to make sure 
that the matched patents in the control group are non-litigated patents by checking if a 
matched patent is also in the group of litigated patents. If a matched patent is also in the 
litigated group, I removed it and performed a new matching process for this litigated 
patent. To check the robustness, I constructed three control groups for each dataset. 
4.2.3 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, litigated, is a dummy variable. If a patent is a litigated patent, 
it takes the value 1, and otherwise 0.  
4.2.4 Independent Variables 
Table 4-1 summarizes the definitions of the independent variables in this study. 
Among them, the number of words/nouns in the first independent claim and the 
ownership of a patent is determined by the following: 
The number of words/nouns in the first independent claim. Generally, the first 
independent claim of a patent contains the broadest patent scope. As such. I use the 
natural logarithm of the number of words or nouns in the first independent claim as the 
indicator of the claim breadth of a patent. For US patents, as words in the sentence are 
separated by spaces, words in the first independent claims can be simply calculated by 
counting the space between words and adding 1. As no space exists between words in 
the sentence in Japanese and Chinese, I use open source software to count the words in 
the first independent claims. For Japanese patents, a piece of software called KH Coder 
is used, and for Chinese patents, a Chinese word segmentation system program called 
ICTCLAS is used. It should be noted that following prior literature conducted by Dang 
and Motohashi (2015), the inverse of the number of nouns was used as an indicator of 
claim breadth instead of the inverse of the number of words for Chinese patents. 
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Table 4-1. Tested Characteristics of Litigated Patents in this Study 
Characteristics Definition 
Previously Tested Characteristics in the US or Germany 
Family size 
The number of countries in which patent rights have been 
applied for with the same invention. 
The number of claims The number of patent claims  
The number of forward citations 
The normalized number of citations received from later patent 
applications. 
The number of backward citations The number of citations made by the patent in question 
The number of 4-digit IPC codes 
The number of 4-digit IPC subclasses assigned by patent 
examiners when issued 
Ownership 
Dummy variables. Patent owners are divided into domestic 
individual, foreign individual, domestic firm and foreign firm. 
Foreign firm is baseline group in the analyses. 
  
Newly Tested Patent Characteristics Put forth in this Study 
Log_number of words/nouns 
Natural logarithm of the number of words or nouns in the 
primary independent claim 
Assertion of domestic priority Dummy variable. If a patent has ever asserted a domestic 
priority, the value equals 1, and otherwise 0. 
Number of inventors The number of inventors written in the front page 
 
Ownership. According to their types (i.e., individual or corporate) and nationalities, I 
divide patent owners into four categories: domestic individuals, domestic corporations, 
foreign individuals, and foreign corporations Firm types are determined by the name of 
the patent owners when the patents were issued. Nationality data of patent owners in the 
US and China are available in the PatentSQAURE database. Nationalities of patent 
owners in Japan are determined by their addresses. In the regression analysis, the 
foreign corporate category is used as the baseline category. 
4.2.5 Analytical Method 
As the dependent variable is a dummy variable (0/1), I use a probit model to do the 
regression analysis. 
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4.3 Empirical Results 
In all the analyses, I use three samples which are the combinations of the litigated 
groups and the three respective control groups.  
Table 4-2 displays regression results of the probability of litigation for a given patent 
in the US. The coefficients for all the variables are highly consistent in the three models. 
All the coefficients for the newly tested patent characteristics are significant. The 
coefficient for the number of words in the independent claim is significantly negative. 
This indicates that patents with more words in the first independent claim are more likely 
to be litigated. Though insignificant in Model 2, the coefficient for assertion of domestic 
priority (i.e., continuation-in-part patent application in the US) is significantly positive in 
Models 1 and 3. Patents which are filed in the form of continuation-in-part patent 
application are more likely to be litigated than others. However, the coefficient for the 
number of inventors is significantly negative. This indicates that patents with more 
inventors are less likely to be litigated. 
Moreover, most of the coefficients for the previously tested patent characteristics are 
consistent with the findings in the prior literature. The coefficients for some variables 
related to patent value, that is, family size, the number of claims, and the number of 
forward citations, are significantly positive. The coefficient for the number of IPC 
subclasses is significantly negative. Moreover, patents originally issued to domestic 
entities are more likely to be litigated than those issued to their foreign counterparts. In 
addition, it is true for both domestic entities and foreign entities that patents owned by 
individuals are more likely to be litigated than those owned by firms. However, the 
coefficient for the number of backward citations are also significantly positive in all 
models, which is consistent with the finding in Germany by Cremers (2004) but not 
with the finding in the US by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004). 
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Table 4-2. Probit Regression of the Probability of Litigation for a Given Patent in the US 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Intercept −0.741*** (0.149) −0.597*** (0.149) -0.811*** (0.150) 
Log_number of words −0.089*** (0.027) −0.108*** (0.027) -0.059** (0.027) 
Assertion of domestic priority 0.156*** (0.053) 0.081 (0.053) 0.218*** (0.054) 
Number of inventors −0.029*** (0.010) −0.026*** (0.010) -0.042*** (0.010) 
Family size 0.039*** (0.003) 0.037*** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Number of claims 0.010*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.043*** (0.003) 
Number of forward citations 0.228*** (0.010) 0.231*** (0.010) 0.229*** (0.010) 
Number of backward citations 0.003*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Number of IPC subclasses −0.124*** (0.032) −0.142*** (0.032) -0.137*** (0.032) 
Domestic individual 0.902*** (0.054) 0.932*** (0.054) 0.882*** (0.054) 
Domestic firms 0.650*** (0.041) 0.642*** (0.041) 0.620*** (0.041) 
Foreign individual 0.407*** (0.106) 0.299*** (0.102) 0.331*** (0.106) 
Observations 7680 7680 7680 
Pseudo R-squared 0.206 0.205 0.206 
Log-likelihood −4224.8 −4230.0 −4225.2 
AIC 8473.5 8484.0 8474.5 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
 
Table 4-3. Probit Regression of the Probability of Litigation for a Given Patent in Japan 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Intercept −0.674* (0.373) 0.048 (0.379) −0.377 (0.380) 
Log_number of words −0.074 (0.059) −0.120** (0.061) −0.133** (0.061) 
Assertion of domestic priority 0.136 (0.132) 0.328** (0.137) 0.264* (0.138) 
Number of inventors −0.040* (0.021) −0.066** (0.021) −0.037* (0.021) 
Number of claims −0.013* (0.008) −0.015* (0.008) −0.010 (0.009) 
Family size 0.064*** (0.014) 0.042*** (0.012) 0.071*** (0.015) 
Number of forward citations 0.225*** (0.024) 0.196*** (0.022) 0.222*** (0.024) 
Number of backward citations 0.083*** (0.010) 0.103*** (0.011) 0.073*** (0.010) 
Number of IPC subclasses −0.028 (0.041) −0.083** (0.041) 0.017 (0.041) 
Domestic individuals 1.291*** (0.205) 1.066*** (0.215) 1.290*** (0.216) 
Domestic firms 0.332** (0.165) 0.001 (0.171) 0.256 (0.175) 
Foreign individuals 5.221 (78.766) −0.176 (0.365) −0.254 (0.364) 
Observations 1396 1396 1396 
Pseudo R-squared 0.180 0.185 0.177 
Log-likelihood −793.5 −788.2 −796.5 
AIC 1611.0 1600.4 1617.0 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
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Table 4-3 shows the regression results of the probability of litigation for a given 
patent in Japan. The coefficients for all the variables are highly consistent in the three 
models. Although two of them are insignificant in Model 1, significant coefficients are 
found for all the three newly tested patent characteristics. The coefficient for the number 
of words in the first independent claim is negative in all the models and significantly 
negative in Models 2 and 3. The coefficient for assertion of domestic priority is positive 
in all models and significantly positive in Models 2 and 3. The coefficient for the 
number of inventors is significantly positive in all models. These results are consistent 
with the regression results in the US. 
Moreover, the coefficients for family size, the number of forward citations and the 
number of backward citations are significantly positive. The coefficient for domestic 
individuals is significantly positive in all models and the coefficient for domestic firms 
is significantly positive in Model 1 though insignificant in Models 2 and 3. Furthermore, 
the coefficient for domestic individuals is 3 times larger than that for domestic firms in 
Model 1, which supports the argument that patents issued to domestic individuals have a 
significantly higher probability of litigation than those issued to domestic firms. These 
results are also consistent with the findings in the US. However, the coefficient for the 
number of claims is negative in all models and significantly negative in Models 1 and 2. 
These results are contrary to the regression results in the US and prior findings in the 
US. Although the coefficient for the number of IPC subclasses is significantly negative 
in Model 2, this finding is unstable in Model 1 and 3. These results are inconsistent with 
the regression results in the US. 
Table 4-4 displays the regression results of the probability of litigation for a given 
patent in China. The coefficients for the newly tested patent characteristics are all 
significant. The coefficient for the number of nouns in the independent claim is 
significantly negative in all models. The coefficient for assertion of domestic priority is 
significantly positive in Models 1 and 2 and positive though insignificant in Model 3. 
The coefficient for the number of inventors is significantly negative in all models. These 
results are consistent with the findings in the US and Japan. 
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Moreover, the coefficient for family size is significantly positive in all models, which 
indicates that patents of higher value are more likely to be litigated. The coefficient for 
domestic entities is significantly positive, which indicates that patents issued to 
domestic entities are more likely to be litigated than their foreign counterparts. 
Furthermore, the coefficient for domestic individuals is bigger than that for domestic 
firms, which indicates that patents issued to domestic individuals are more likely to be 
litigated. These results are also consistent with the regression results in the US and 
Japan. However, the coefficients for the number of claims and the number of IPC 
subclasses are insignificant though they are consistently positive and negative, 
respectively, in all models.  
Table 4-4. Probit Regression of the Probability of Litigation for a Given Patent in China 
 Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 
Intercept −0.196 (0.256) 0.106 (0.263) −0.158 (0.250) 
Log_number of nouns −0.105* (0.060) −0.164*** (0.061) −0.109* (0.057) 
Assertion of domestic priority 1.356*** (0.467) 0.689** (0.312) 0.405 (0.255) 
Number of inventors −0.078*** (0.022) −0.069*** (0.024) −0.043* (0.024) 
Number of claims 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 
Family size 0.042*** (0.008) 0.038*** (0.008) 0.039*** (0.008) 
Number of IPC subclasses −0.061 (0.050) −0.080 (0.051) −0.080 (0.050) 
Domestic individual 1.230*** (0.112) 1.212*** (0.115) 1.169*** (0.112) 
Domestic firms 0.844*** (0.122) 0.759*** (0.121) 0.728*** (0.118) 
Foreign individual 0.097 (0.230) −0.020 (0.240) 0.188 (0.232) 
Observations 1196 1196 1196 
Pseudo R-squared 0.114 0.109 0.091 
Log-likelihood −734.5 −738.5 −753.4 
AIC 1489.1 1496.9 1526.9 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
4.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, I investigate the effect of some previously tested and three previously 
untested patent characteristics on the probability of litigation for a given patent in the 
US, Japan, and China. Table 4-5 summarizes the findings. Most of the characteristics of 
litigated patents found in the US could also be used to predict the probability of 
litigation for a patent in Japan or China.  
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Table 4-5. Summary of the Findings in the US, Japan, and China. 
 The US Japan China 
Log_number of words/nouns －/*** －/** －/** 
Assertion of domestic priority ＋/*** ＋/** ＋/** 
Number of inventors －/*** －/** －/*** 
Number of claims ＋/*** －/* ＋/ 
Family size ＋/*** ＋/*** ＋/*** 
Number of forward citations ＋/*** ＋/***  
Number of backward citations ＋/** ＋/***  
Number of IPC subclasses －/*** －/ －/ 
Domestic individual ＋/*** ＋/*** ＋/*** 
Domestic firms ＋/*** ＋/** ＋/*** 
Foreign individual ＋/*** ＋/ ＋/ 
+/－: symbols of the coefficients *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
(1) The effect of patent scope on the probability of patent litigation 
Three of the variables in this chapter are presented as patent scope indicators: the 
number of words or nouns in the first independent claims, the number of claims, and the 
number of IPC subclasses. Theoretically, patents with broader patent scopes are more 
likely to be infringed upon, and this kind of infringements are usually more likely to be 
detected. Therefore, patents with broader patent scopes are theoretically more likely to 
be litigated. The finding that patents with more words or nouns in the first independent 
claim are less likely to be litigated validated this argument. More words or nouns in the 
first independent claim indicate that there are more limitations in the claim, which 
results in a narrower patent scope.  
However, the effect of the number of claims on the probability of litigation differs 
across countries. Although, as expected, patents with more claims are more likely to be 
litigated in the US, they are less likely to be litigated in Japan, and no significant effect 
on the probability of litigation is found in China. One possible interpretation is that 
people’s attitudes toward patent litigation differ between across countries As patents 
with more claims usually have more dependent claims, which define specific inventions, 
they are less likely to be invalidated and more enforceable in court. In other words, 
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patent with more claims are usually stronger patents. Yamaguchi and Nagano (2015) 
argued that one of the main reasons why the number of patent litigation in Japan are 
significantly fewer in Japan than those in the US and China is that the Japanese are 
more pessimistic toward litigation. This might lead to a consequence that both the 
infringed infringer and Japanese patent holders are more likely to resolve a patent 
disputes involving strong patent rights by other approaches, such as a pretrial settlement. 
The Chinese take an approach somewhere between the Japanese and the Americans and 
thus the effect in China is insignificant though positive. 
Additionally, it was unexpected that patents assigned more IPC subclasses are less 
likely to be litigated in the US. There are two possible interpretations for this result. 
First, although the number of IPC subclasses has long been argued as an indicator of 
patent scope, unlike the number of words or nouns in the first independent claim, the 
scope indicated by the number of IPC subclasses is more related to the utility breadth of 
the patented invention. Because of this, patents with more IPC subclasses are 
theoretically more likely to be infringed. However, as patent holders usually can only 
detect the infringement acts relating to their own business, most of the infringement acts 
to this kind of patents will be out of the detection capacity of their patent holders. From 
this perspective, the number of IPC subclasses will not increase the probability of 
litigation for a given patent. On the other hand, patents with more IPC subclasses also 
indicate that they are more basic and thus less immediately relevant to market outcomes. 
In other words, patents assigned fewer IPC subclasses are more likely to be incremental 
inventions which are more related to market outcomes. Therefore, it takes longer time 
for this kind of patents to be used in practice, then to be infringed, and finally to be 
litigated. Most patents with many IPC subclasses may expire before it is infringed upon. 
From this perspective. The number of IPC subclasses are expected to decrease the 
probability of litigation for a given patent. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
number of IPC subclasses does not have explanatory power in Japan and China though 
the coefficients for it are also negative. This is probably because the number of IPC 
subclasses is not a good approximation of market relevance of a patent in Japan and 
China, which results from different ways of assigning IPC codes. This should be further 
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studied in the future research. 
 (2) The effect of patent value on the probability of patent litigation 
Infringement of a valuable patent usually involves higher stakes than infringement of 
an ordinary patent. As patent litigation is costly in terms of time and money, both parties 
will choose to resolve a patent dispute through litigation only when the stakes are big 
enough. Therefore, theoretically, valuable patents are more likely to be litigated. 
Two of the most well-established patent value indicators are used in the models: 
family size and the number of forward citations. The coefficients for them are 
significantly positive in all models. This affirms the prior argument that valuable patents 
are more likely to be litigated. In addition, as noted in Section 4.1, patents with more 
inventors are also argued to be more valuable. However, the coefficient for the number 
of inventors, which is argued to be positively associated with patent value, are 
significantly negative in all the three countries. One possible explanation is that potential 
infringers avoid infringing patents with many inventors. The number of inventors of a 
patent might indicate that the patented invention is a result of a big R&D project which is 
extremely important for the patent holder. It is logic to believe that the patent holder will 
devote more efforts to protect this invention. Therefore, infringement of a patent with 
many inventors is more likely to be detected and sued by its patent holder. This makes 
potential infringers avoid infringing this kind of patents. 
(3) The effect of ownership on the probability of patent litigation 
Patent ownership is divided into four categories: domestic individuals, domestic firms, 
foreign individuals, and foreign firms. On the one hand, the regression results show that 
patents issued to domestic individuals and firms are significantly more likely to be 
litigated. One plausible interpretation for this finding is that domestic patent owners 
have an advantage in detecting patent infringement, and it is less costly for them to file 
a patent infringement suit than their foreign counterpart. On the other hand, the 
regression result confirms the prior findings that patents issued to individuals are found 
to be significantly more likely to be litigated than those issued to firms. This is probably 
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because individual patent owners have less bargaining chips to reach a settlement 
instead of filing a patent suit. However, this effect is insignificant between patents 
issued to foreign individuals and foreign firms in Japan and China. This is probably 
because the number of patents issued to foreign individuals in the dataset are so small 
(33-35 for Chinese datasets, 7-17 for Japanese datasets) that the regression results for 
foreign individuals in Japan and China are temporary and without merit. 
(4) The effect of patenting strategies on the probability of litigation 
As noted in Section 4.1, the domestic priority system in Japan and China and the 
continuation-in-part (CIP) patent application in the US allows patent applicants to add 
new subject matters to a previously filed patent application. As an experienced patent 
applicant will adjust its patent strategies according to its competitors’ innovation 
tendency, the domestic priority system and CIP patent application are probably used by 
patent applicants strategically to trap their competitor’s innovations. Therefore, 
theoretically, patents asserting domestic priority in Japan and China or applied for in the 
form of CIP patent application are more likely to be litigated than ordinary patents. The 
regression results support this argument.  
(5) The effect of the number of backward citations on the probability of litigation 
As noted in Section 1.3.2, prior studies have not reached a consensus on the effect of 
the number of backward citations and the probability of litigation for a given patent. 
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001, 2004) argued that a small number of backward 
citations indicates that the patent belongs to a relatively new technology field which is 
more uncertain. This makes it difficult for the parties of a patent dispute to make similar 
expectations of the outcome of the litigation. As a result, they are more likely to resolve 
the dispute by litigation rather than settlement.  
On the other hand, the number of backward citations can also be interpreted in 
another way. As backward cited patents are usually technologically similar to the citing 
patent, more backward citations indicate that many innovators are interested in the same 
technology field. This makes patents with many backward citations more likely to be 
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infringed by other innovators and thus more likely to be involved in patent litigation. 
This argument is supported by prior studies by Allison et al. (2003) and Cremers (2004). 
In this chapter, the significant and positive coefficient for the number of backward 
citations in the US and Japan provides new evidence to this argument. 
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Chapter 5 The Characteristics of Patent Litigants 
5.1 Research Question 
In Chapter 4, the characteristics of patent litigation are examined at the patent level. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, no empirical analysis has been conducted upon 
the characteristics of patent litigation at the firm level. It is logical to believe that firms 
have different propensity to enforce their patents by litigation. This can be reflected in 
the characteristics of their patent portfolios, and are affected by their firm sizes and their 
patent portfolio size. Therefore, in this chapter, I provide an empirical analysis of the 
characteristics of patent litigants in Japan. As noted in Section 1.5.2, I attempt to answer 
the following question: 
Q7: Can the characteristics of a patent portfolio be used to predict the probability of 
patent litigation at the firm level? 
 
5.2 Datasets and Variables 
5.2.1 Data Description 
From the IP litigation database provided by the Supreme Court of Japan, I collect 671 
patent cases decided during the period from 2000 to 2014. Among them, those filed 
during the period from 2001 to 2010 are used in this chapter. I have refined the data as 
follows. First, as the names of individual plaintiffs are not written in the decisions of 
Japanese patent litigation, I only analyzed plaintiff firms in this chapter. Second, as 
firms registered in different districts can be registered under same name in Japan, 
tracing the records of patent application by firm names will be misleading. Therefore, I 
use identification numbers which are unique to each firm to trace the records of patent 
applications by the plaintiff firms. As the identification number system was introduced 
into the Japanese patent system in the December of 1990, firms that have never filed a 
patent application since then were not assigned an identification number. Therefore, I 
removed these firms from the sample. Third, some plaintiff firms are not original 
assignees of the litigated patents. The characteristics of the patent portfolio of these 
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plaintiff firms probably do not explain why they were involved in patent litigation 
because these characteristics probably differ from those of the litigated patent 
transferred from others. Therefore, I removed these firms from the study. 
5.2.2 Control Group Sampling 
Control firms are matched for plaintiff firms with the ratio of 1:1. To control the 
effect of technology fields, I selected control firms from the corporate applicants of 
backward citations of the litigated patents because they apply for patents in similar 
technology fields with plaintiff firms. Among them, the applicants of corporate-filed 
applications whose application date is nearest to that of the litigated patent is extracted 
as the control firm of the litigated patent. I attempt to ensure that the control firms did 
not file a patent lawsuit in the same year with their litigating firms. However, some 
litigating firms cannot be matched to a control firm with this method. I exclude these 
litigating firms from the study. With this method, I finally get 154 pairs of litigating 
firms and control firms. 
5.2.3 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable, litigated, is a dummy variable. The value equals 1 for the 
firms in the litigated group and equals 0 for the firms in the control group. 
5.2.4 Independent Variables 
Table 5-1 summarizes the independent variables used in this chapter. Except the firm 
type variable, all the variables are calculated according to the characteristics of the firms’ 
patent portfolio, which is defined as the granted patents applied for in the past 10 years 
before the filing year of a patent case in question. I set the extraction interval to 10 years 
because, as the identification number started to be used in December 1990 and patent 
cases used in this study were filed during the period from 2001 to 2010, I will lose most 
of the sample firms if I attempt to trace the 20-year patent application history. 
Firm size is defined according to the number of employees in 2015. According to the 
standard by Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in Japan, firms with fewer than 300 
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employees are classified as SMEs and those with more than 300 employees are 
classified as big firms. I mainly investigate the number of employees in a commercial 
firm information database provided by Tokyo Shoko Research, LTD and partly from 
firms’ websites. For firms that I cannot get employee number with these two methods 
for, I simply classify them as SMEs because big firms usually have their own websites. 
Table 5-1. Tested Characteristics of Litigating Patentees in this Study 
Characteristics Definition 
Log_patent portfolio size Natural logarithm of a firm’s patent portfolio size (the 
number of granted patents which are filed over previous 
10 years before the filling year of the patent case). 
Log_average number of words  
Natural logarithm of the average number of words in 
the primary independent claims of the patent portfolio. 
Ratio_domestic priority patents 
The ratio of patents which have ever asserted domestic 
priority to the patent portfolio size. 
Average number of inventors 
The average number of inventors of all the patents in 
the patent portfolio. 
Average number of claims 
The average number of claims of all the patents in the 
patent portfolio. 
Ratio_foreign priority patents 
The ratio of patents the family size of which is more 
than 1 to the patent portfolio size. 
Average number of forward citations 
The average number of forward citations of all the 
patents in the patent portfolio. 
Average number of backward citations 
The average number of backward citations of all the 
patents in the patent portfolio. 
Average number of IPC codes 
The average number of assigned 4-digit IPC codes of 
all the patents in the patent portfolio. 
Types of firms 
The firms are divided into three categories: Japanese 
SMEs, Japanese big firms and foreign firms 
 
5.2.5 Analytical Method 
As the dependent variable is a dummy variable (0/1), I use a probit model to do the 
regression analysis. 
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5.3 Empirical Results and Discussions 
Table 5-2 displays the regression results of the probability of litigation for a given 
firm in Japan. Model 1 uses the entire sample and Model 2 excludes foreign firms from 
the sample. The rightmost column shows the corresponding regression results at the 
patent level. 
Table 5-2. Probit Regression Results of the Probability of Litigation for a Given Firm in Japan 
 Model 1 Model 2  
Intercept 0.861 (1.406) 1.171 (1.494)  
Log_patent portfolio size −0.050 (0.043) −0.057 (0.045)  
Log_average number of words  −0.310 (0.234) −0.298 (0.265) －/** 
Ratio_domestic priority patents −0.156 (0.677) 0.494 (0.760) ＋/** 
Average number of inventors 0.028 (0.061) −0.058 (0.086) －/** 
Average number of claims −0.069* (0.038) −0.086* (0.046) －/* 
Ratio_foreign priority patents 0.898** (0.414) 0.929** (0.450) ＋/*** 
Average number of forward citations 0.392** (0.173) 0.571*** (0.217) ＋/*** 
Average number of backward citations 0.092* (0.048) 0.052 (0.053) ＋/*** 
Average number of IPC subclasses −0.047 (0.157) 0.021 (0.189) －/ 
Domestic SMEs 0.885* (0.494) 0.641** (0.267)  
Domestic big firms 0.242 (0.506)    
Observations 308 270  
Pseudo R-squared 0.097 0.107  
Log-likelihood −192.9 −167.1  
AIC 409.8 356.2  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
 
As at the patent level, several characteristics of patent portfolio are found to have the 
same effect on the probability of litigation at the firm level. First, the coefficient for the 
average number of claims is significantly negative. This indicates that firms which tend 
to apply for more dependent claims in a patent application are less likely to be litigated. 
As noted in Section 4.4, the Japanese are generally pessimistic toward litigation. 
Therefore, it is easier for Japanese patent holders and alleged infringers to reach a 
settlement in disputes involving patents with more dependent claims, which are less 
likely to be invalidated and are more enforceable in court. Second, the coefficients for 
patent value indicators, namely the ratio of patents asserting foreign priority and the 
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average number of forward citations, are significantly positive in both models. This 
indicates that firms owning many valuable patents are more likely to be involved in 
patent litigation as a patent litigant. Third, the coefficient for the average number of 
backward citations is significantly positive in Model 1 and positive though insignificant 
in Model 2. This indicates that firms applying for patents in more crowded technology 
fields are more likely to be involved in patent litigation as a patent litigant. In addition, 
the coefficient for domestic SMEs is significantly positive in both models. This 
indicates that domestic SME firms are more likely to litigate their patents than foreign 
firms (the baseline in Model 1) and domestic big firms (the baseline Model 2). 
However, not all the variables tested in this chapter are significant. First, as noted in 
Section 1.3.2, patent portfolio size has a significantly negative effect on the probability 
of litigation for a given patent at the patent level. However, the coefficient for patent 
portfolio size is insignificant at the firm level. This is probably because the positive and 
negative effects of patent portfolio size on the probability of litigation counteract each 
other at the firm level. On the one hand, a large patent portfolio provides a strong 
bargaining chip for the patent holder to reach a settlement so that the probability of 
litigation will be reduced at the patent level. On the other hand, a large number of 
patents will also increase the probability of a patent holder being infringed upon and 
thus being involved in litigation as a patent litigant. The result observed in this chapter 
might be the comprehensive outcome of the relative strengths of these two opposite 
effects. Second, as at the patent level, the coefficient for the average number of IPC 
subclasses is still insignificant at the firm level. As noted in Section 4.4, this is probably 
because the number of IPC subclasses has less market relevance in Japan. Third, unlike 
at the patent level, all the coefficients for the three newly tested patent characteristics 
are insignificant at the firm level. A possible interpretation for the insignificant 
coefficient for the average number of words in the first independent claims, and the 
ratio of the patents asserting domestic priority, is that their effects on the probability of 
patent litigation might depend on the technology fields of the patented inventions. The 
number of words in the first independent claims might vary greatly across technology 
fields and domestic priority might be strategically used in some technology fields but 
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not in others. In Chapter 4, as control groups are constructed by random sampling of a 
non-litigated patent that was applied for in the same year and technology field as the 
litigated patent, the effect of technology fields is controlled for. Even so, one of the 
three models in Table 4-4 is still insignificant. In this chapter, because of the limitations 
of sampling methods for control group, the effect of technology fields is not well 
controlled for at the firm level. For this reason, the effects of the average number of 
words in the first independent claim and the ratio of the patents asserting domestic 
priority for some specific technology fields are not observed. In addition, a possible 
interpretation for the insignificant coefficient for the average number of inventors is that 
unlike its counterpart at the patent level, the average number of inventors at the firm 
level might just indicate the distinct organization form of R&D teams in a firm instead 
of the importance of the patented invention. Larger average numbers of inventors might 
indicate R&D projects in these firms are always conducted in a big team while a smaller 
number of inventors might indicate R&D projects in these firms are always subdivided 
into smaller subprojects so that each subproject can be conducted by a small number of 
individuals. If this is true, the threatening effect identified at the patent level might not 
be identified for the average number of inventors at the firm level. 
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Chapter 6 The Effects of Patent Litigation on Plaintiff SMEs 
6.1 Research Questions 
As patent litigation is usually costly, patent holders should weigh advantages and 
disadvantages before filing a patent infringement suit. This is especially important for 
SMEs because they usually face more difficulties in benefiting from patent litigation 
than their larger counterparts. In this study, I examine the effects of patent litigation on 
plaintiff SMEs from two perspectives. First, from an organizational learning perspective, 
patent litigation may present a good opportunity for innovators to learn to use the patent 
system more effectively. This is particularly important for SMEs which usually have 
little experience or expertise in this area. Second, high costs of patent litigation may 
place such a heavy burden on SMEs that their regular R&D activities may be adversely 
affected. I expect that these effects will be reflected in SMEs’ subsequent patenting 
behaviors. To put it in another way, I attempt to answer the following two questions: 
Q8: Do the high costs of patent litigation negatively impact plaintiff SMEs’ patenting 
activities? 
Q9: Does patent litigation provide a good chance for plaintiff SMEs to learn to apply 
for strong patent rights? 
6.2 Datasets and Variables 
6.2.1 Data Description 
Litigation data used in this chapter are collected from the intellectual property case 
history database provided by the Supreme Court of Japan. To make the impact of patent 
litigation consistent in the sample, I refined the plaintiff firms by the following steps. 
First, I collected all the plaintiff firms for the patent cases decided in Japan during the 
period from 2000 to 2008. Second, as it is logical to expect that SMEs are more likely to 
be influenced by litigation than large firms, I focused on SMEs in this chapter. SMEs 
are defined here as the firms with fewer than 300 employees, which is the standard used 
by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency in Japan. Third, because manufacturing 
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firms are the central sources of technological innovation, I excluded non-manufacturing 
SMEs, such as sales companies and construction firms, from the analysis. Fourth, as 
most foreign SMEs do not locate their R&D centers in Japan, I excluded them from the 
analysis. Fifth, as firms registered in different districts can have the same name, it 
would be misleading for us to trace patenting history by firm name. Therefore, I used 
identification numbers, which are unique to each patentee, to trace its patent application 
history. However, I failed to find identification numbers of some SMEs because some 
firms have never applied for a patent right since the identification number system was 
introduced in 1990. Therefore, I removed these firms from the sample. In this way, I 
collected a total of 142 patent cases, which involved 121 domestic plaintiff SMEs. 
6.2.2 Dependent Variables 
To examine the effect of patent litigation on the patenting behavior of plaintiff SMEs, 
the number of patent applications and the number of forward citations are used as 
quantitative and qualitative indicators, respectively. Both the maximum number of 
forward citations which were received by the most-cited patent among the granted 
patents applied for by a plaintiff SME in a cohort and the average number of forward 
citations which were received by the granted patents filed by a plaintiff SME in a cohort 
are used to examine the learning effects of patent litigation. 
It should be noted that, although the number of forward citations is always used as an 
indicator of patent value, it is used as an indicator of the strength of patent rights in this 
chapter. For a given patent, the number of forward citations could be influenced by the 
writing style of the patent specifications and patent claims. First, generic terms could be 
used to apply for a broader patent. Second, patent rights could also be strengthened by 
writing more claims. Both these strategies result in patent rights with broader scopes 
and are more likely to be cited by patent examiners as prior art to restrict the claims of 
later patent applications. Therefore, I argue that the number of forward citations can also 
be used as an indicator of the strength of patent rights. 
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6.2.3 Independent Variables 
As the impact of patent litigation may last for several years, I use a distributed lag 
model, which has been used in two prior studies (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Ernst, 2001). 
I use five lagged litigation variables (litigationt-1-litigationt-5), five lagged ExtremeCost 
litigation variables (ExtremeCostt-1-ExtremeCostt-5), five lagged winning variables 
(wint-1-wint-5) if the plaintiff SME won the litigation, and five lagged losing variables 
(loset-1-loset-5) if the plaintiff SME lost the litigation. Litigationt-x is the number of 
patent cases decided by the courts for the plaintiff SMEs x years before the observation 
year. Other lagged variables are defined in a similar way. 
Among the sample, approximately 57 cases were appealed to higher courts. For these 
cases, it is difficult to determine whether the impact of patent litigation occurred after the 
first decision or final decision. Therefore, I examine both possibilities. For the former, I 
used the decision year of the first instance as the benchmark to define the lagged variables. 
For the latter, I used the final decision year of the litigation as the benchmark to define the 
lagged variables. This means that, if a lawsuit was appealed to a higher court, litigationt-x 
is the number of patent cases decided by the courts for the plaintiff SMEs x years before 
the decision year of the second instance. 
6.2.4 Control Variables 
Year dummies. Year dummies are used to control for the time trends. 
Knowledge stock. As knowledge stock is an important element that influences 
innovation output, and I control for it in the regression of the number of patent 
applications. It is defined as the sum of patent applications over the previous five years. 
The number of granted patents. I control for the number of granted patents applied 
for by the plaintiff SMEs in the same year in the regression of the maximum number of 
forward citations and the average number of forward citations. 
6.2.5 Analytical model 
As noted above, I collected a total of 142 patent cases involving 121 domestic 
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plaintiff SMEs for further cleaning. I traced the patenting behavior of these SMEs in 
Japan Patent Office over a consecutive ten-year period from 2000 to 2009. As one of the 
SMEs was established in 2002, I only obtained eight observations for it. 
As both the number of patent applications and the number of forward citations obey a 
Poisson distribution and the data are panel data, I used the fixed-effect Poisson model 
for the analyses. I used the pglm package for the regressions using R software. However, 
it should be noted that, as the pglm package automatically excludes firms whose 
dependent variables are constant during the observation period, I was forced to omit these 
samples in the regressions. Among the 121 firms, five had never applied for a patent and 
another 17 were never granted a patent during the observation period. For the reasons 
mentioned above, the former is excluded from the regressions of the number of patent 
applications and both the former and the latter are excluded from the regressions of the 
number of forward citations. Furthermore, the number of forward citations will certainly 
be zero for the observations with no patents granted. As these observations do not 
provide any information on the strength of patent applications, I excluded them from the 
regression analysis of the number of forward citations. After this refining process, 13 
firms only had one observation in the dataset. As panel data require that the number of 
observations for each firm is greater than one, I excluded these 13 firms from the 
sample. 
Table 6-1 displays the distribution of patent cases for each regression analysis. The 
total numbers of patent cases in columns 3 and 5 are smaller than those in columns 2 
and 4, respectively. This is because six patent cases that were appealed to higher courts 
were decided by the courts after 2008. Although the plaintiff SMEs involved in these 
patent cases are also included in the analysis of the effect of patent litigation after the 
final instance, they actually function as a control group because their corresponding 
lagged variables defined by the final decision year are outside the 2000 to 2009 
observation period. The same thing happens in the analysis of the effect of the litigation 
with extremely high costs, where the plaintiff SMEs claiming damages of less than 100 
billion Japanese yen function as a control group. 
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Table 6-1. The Distribution of Patent Cases for Each Regression Analysis by Decision Year. 
 For the analysis of patent applications For the analysis of forward citations 
Decision 
year 
after the first 
instance 
after the final 
instance 
after the first 
instance 
after the final 
instance 
2000 18(7) 9(4) 16 7 
2001 24(7) 23(5) 16 16 
2002 25(10) 24(10) 22 20 
2003 9(1) 18(6) 4 11 
2004 18(6) 15(5) 11 8 
2005 14(3) 17(3) 9 11 
2006 8(3) 6(3) 2 1 
2007 11(4) 7(3) 7 4 
2008 7(3) 9(2) 3 6 
Total 134(44) 128(41) 90 84 
Numbers in parentheses are the number of patent cases with extremely high costs. 
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6.3 Empirical Results 
In all the following analyses, Model 1 uses the lagged variables defined by the 
decision year of the first instance, and Model 2 uses the lagged variables defined by the 
final decision year. 
Table 2 displays the regression results for the effects of patent litigation on the number 
of subsequent patent applications. In Model 1, the coefficients for all the lagged 
litigation variables are negative. Among them, the coefficients for the second-year and 
third-year lagged litigation variables are significantly negative. This indicates that 
patent litigation leads to a significant decrease in the number of patent applications in 
the second and third years after litigation. Similar results can be seen in Model 2. 
However, the coefficient for the first-year lagged variable is significant in comparison to 
the significant coefficient for the second-year lagged variable after the final decision 
year. This difference is probably because the effect of the 51 patent cases that appealed 
to higher courts on subsequent patent applications started with the decision of the first 
instance and disappeared before the second year after the final decision. 
Table 6-2. The Effect of Patent Litigation on the Number of Subsequent Patent Applications. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Knowledge Stock 0.002*** (0.0003) 0.002*** (0.0003) 
Litigationt-1 −0.031  (0.041) −0.124***  (0.044) 
Litigationt-2 −0.087**  (0.044) −0.057  (0.047) 
Litigationt-3 −0.203*** (0.055) −0.231*** (0.057) 
Litigationt-4 −0.074  (0.055) −0.094*  (0.056) 
Litigationt-5 −0.050  (0.061) −0.088  (0.062) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes 
Observations 1158 1158 
Log-Likelihood −2228.0 −2231.1 
AIC 4486.0 4492.3 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
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One concern is that the effects of patent litigation on subsequent patent applications 
may differ according to the different outcomes of patent litigation. Therefore, I 
separately examine the effects of patent litigation by the outcome in terms of winning 
and losing. Table 6-3 displays the regression results. In Model 1, the coefficients for all 
lagged winning dummies are significantly negative, except in the fourth year. On the 
other hand, the coefficients for the lagged losing dummies in Model 1 turn from 
significantly positive in the first year to significantly negative in the fourth year. One 
plausible interpretation is that, although patent litigation negatively affects subsequent 
patent applications, losing a patent lawsuit enhances the crisis awareness of the plaintiff 
SME and thus stimulates it to strengthen its patent portfolio for several years after 
patent litigation. The positive effect is significantly larger than the negative effect in the 
first year after patent litigation. However, as the crisis awareness gradually weakens, the 
negative effect exceeds the positive effect in the fourth year after litigation. Similar 
results can be seen in Model 2, which uses the lagged winning variables and lagged 
losing variables, as defined according to the final decision year. 
Table 6-3. The Effect of Patent Litigation on Subsequent Patent Applications by Outcome. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Knowledge Stock 0.002*** (0.0003) 0.002*** (0.0003) 
Wint-1 −0.367*** (0.083) −0.332*** (0.083) 
Wint-2 −0.297*** (0.087) −0.296*** (0.089) 
Wint-3 −0.483*** (0.109) −0.494*** (0.111) 
Wint-4 0.067  (0.088) 0.103  (0.086) 
Wint-5 −0.221**  (0.103) −0.244**  (0.104) 
Loset-1 0.102**  (0.047) −0.032  (0.052) 
Loset-2 −0.009  (0.051) 0.049  (0.055) 
Loset-3 −0.093  (0.063) −0.119*  (0.065) 
Loset-4 −0.137**  (0.067) −0.187*** (0.069) 
Loset-5 0.051  (0.072) 0.002  (0.074) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1158 1158 
Log-Likelihood −2204.0 −2210.8 
AIC 4448.1 4461.6 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1  
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Table 6-4 displays the regression results for the effect of patent litigation with 
extremely high costs, where the claimed damages are at least 100 million Japanese yen, 
on subsequent patent applications. In Model 1, the coefficients for the lagged 
ExtremeCost variables are significantly negative from the second year to the fifth year 
after patent litigation. Compared with the results of Model 1 in Table 2, the negative 
effect of patent litigation with extremely high costs lasts significantly longer than the 
average effect of all patent litigation. Furthermore, the absolute value of these 
significant coefficients is greater than that of Model 1 in Table 2. This suggests that the 
higher the costs of patent litigation, the more significant the negative effect. Model 2 
shows similar results and the negative effect is significant, beginning with the first year 
after the final decision. As noted above, this is probably because the effects of the patent 
cases that appealed to a higher court on subsequent patent applications started from the 
decision year of the first instance. 
Table 6-4. The Effect of Patent Litigations with Extremely High Costs on Subsequent Patent Applications. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Knowledge Stock 0.002*** (0.0002) 0.002*** (0.0002) 
ExtremeCost t-1 0.088  (0.066) −0.169**  (0.078) 
ExtremeCost t-2 −0.162**  (0.080) −0.288*** (0.089) 
ExtremeCost t-3 −0.460*** (0.108) −0.522*** (0.113) 
ExtremeCost t-4 −0.268*** (0.104) −0.301*** (0.103) 
ExtremeCost t-5 −0.625*** (0.129) −0.580*** (0.124) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 1158 1158 
Log-Likelihood −2207.2 −2213.7 
AIC 4444.4 4457.5 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
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Tables 6-5 and 6-6 display the effects of patent litigation on the strength of 
subsequent patent applications. The models in Table 6-5 use the maximum number of 
forward citations as the dependent variable. The models in Table 6-6 use the average 
number of forward citations as the dependent variable. In Table 6-5, the coefficients for 
the first four lagged litigation variables of Model 1 are all significantly positive. This 
indicates that patent litigation motivates the plaintiff SMEs to improve the strength of 
their patent applications in the following four years after patent litigation. Similar 
results can be seen in Model 2. However, this effect only lasts until the fourth year after 
patent litigation. The coefficient for the fifth-year lagged litigation variable is 
insignificant in Model 1 and significantly negative in Model 2. This is probably because 
the plaintiff SMEs have forgotten about the importance of the strength and 
enforceability of patent rights, and the knowledge about how to apply for stronger 
patent rights beginning with the fifth year after patent litigation. The significantly 
negative coefficient for the fifth-year lagged litigation variable in Model 2 indicates that 
the plaintiff SMEs tend to return to their original patenting strategy, which attaches 
more weight to the probability of passing the patent examinations than to the strength 
and enforceability of their patent rights. Similar results are seen in Table 6-6. 
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Table 6-5. The Effect of Patent Litigation on the Strength of Subsequent Patent Applications 
(Using the Maximum Number of Forward Citations as the Dependent Variable). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Granted Patents 0.019*** (0.001) 0.021*** (0.001) 
Litigationt-1 0.154*** (0.029) 0.213*** (0.030) 
Litigationt-2 0.219*** (0.030) 0.192*** (0.032) 
Litigationt-3 0.284*** (0.031) 0.354*** (0.031) 
Litigationt-4 0.132*** (0.036) 0.126*** (0.037) 
Litigationt-5 0.053  (0.041) −0.180*** (0.046) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 534 534 
Log-Likelihood −4145.4 −4098.9 
AIC 8320.8 8227.8 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
 
Table 6-6. The Effect of Patent Litigation on the Strength of Subsequent Patent Applications 
(Using the Average Number of Forward Citations as the Dependent Variable). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Granted Patents −0.007**  (0.003) −0.006**  (0.003) 
Litigationt-1 0.024  (0.045) 0.075  (0.047) 
Litigationt-2 0.159*** (0.046) 0.232*** (0.046) 
Litigationt-3 0.091*  (0.048) 0.082*  (0.050) 
Litigationt-4 0.095*  (0.056) 0.163*** (0.056) 
Litigationt-5 0.119**  (0.060) −0.186*** (0.070) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Observations 534 534 
Log-Likelihood −2452.4 −2436.5 
AIC 4934.7 4903.1 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
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I also attempt to examine whether the effect of patent litigation on the strength of 
subsequent patent applications varies by the outcomes of patent litigation. Tables 6-7 
and 6-8 display the regression results of the maximum number of forward citations and 
the average number of forward citations, respectively. Columns 4 and 7 in Tables 6-7 
and 6-8 show the number of non-zero values for each lagged variable. There are only a 
few observations for the lagged winning variables, and the regression results for the 
lagged winning variables are unstable. These results are probably temporary and 
without merit. Therefore, I do not attempt to provide any further interpretation. On the 
other hand, like the regression results in Table 6, the coefficients for the lagged losing 
variables from the first year to the fourth year are significantly positive for both models 
in Table 6-7. The coefficient for the fifth-year lagged losing variable is insignificant in 
Model 1 and significantly negative in Model 2. Similar results are also seen in Table 
6-8. 
 
Table 6-7. The Effect of Patent Litigation on the Strength of Subsequent Patent Applications by Outcome 
(Using the Maximum Number of Forward Citations as the Indicator). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Granted Patents 0.020*** (0.001)  0.022*** (0.001)  
Wint-1 −0.166*** (0.058) 15 −0.263*** (0.060) 15 
Wint-2 0.347*** (0.046) 17 0.325*** (0.047) 14 
Wint-3 0.182*** (0.061) 11 0.269*** (0.058) 11 
Wint-4 −0.221*** (0.072) 11 −0.137**  (0.067) 12 
Wint-5 0.063  (0.064) 11 −0.045  (0.068) 10 
Loset-1 0.264*** (0.033) 45 0.416*** (0.035) 42 
Loset-2 0.129*** (0.038) 34 0.117*** (0.041) 33 
Loset-3 0.329*** (0.036) 31 0.395*** (0.037) 32 
Loset-4 0.265*** (0.041) 30 0.261*** (0.043) 29 
Loset-5 0.030  (0.051) 22 −0.261*** (0.059) 19 
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  
Observations 534  534  
Log-Likelihood −4088.2  −4013.8  
AIC 8216.5  8067.6  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
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Table 6-8. The Effect of Patent Litigation on the Strength of Subsequent Patent Applications by Outcome 
(Using the Average Number of Forward Citations as the Indicator). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Granted Patents −0.007  (0.003)  −0.005*  (0.003)  
Wint-1 −0.204**  (0.092) 15 −0.323*** (0.097) 15 
Wint-2 0.285*** (0.071) 17 0.262*** (0.073) 14 
Wint-3 −0.027  (0.105) 11 0.207**  (0.091) 11 
Wint-4 0.012  (0.100) 11 −0.006  (0.096) 12 
Wint-5 0.192**  (0.091) 11 0.083  (0.100) 10 
Loset-1 0.094*  (0.052) 45 0.242*** (0.055) 42 
Loset-2 0.063  (0.060) 34 0.219*** (0.058) 33 
Loset-3 0.123*** (0.053) 31 0.043  (0.058) 32 
Loset-4 0.120** (0.065) 30 0.252*** (0.066) 29 
Loset-5 0.055  (0.074) 22 −0.368*** (0.093) 19 
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  
Observations 534  534  
Log-Likelihood −4088.2  −4013.8  
AIC 8216.5  8067.6  
Standard errors in parentheses *** p ＜ 0.01, ** p ＜ 0.05, * p ＜ 0.1 
6.4 Discussion 
There are two concerns about the interpretation of the regression results: 
 (1) Can the decrease in subsequent patent applications be interpreted as the negative 
effect of patent litigation on R&D activities? 
A lag period of two or three years usually exists between R&D activities and patent 
applications. And a total of 82% of the first instances of patent cases in the sample lasts 
for two to three years. The time lag between the R&D activity and patent application is 
about three years. Therefore, if the decrease in subsequent patent applications is due to 
the negative effect of patent litigation on R&D activities, it will occur beginning with 
the first or second year after patent litigation. This is consistent with the results in 
Tables 2 and 4, which show that the decrease in subsequent applications begins with the 
second year after patent litigation. On the other hand, if the decrease in subsequent 
applications is mainly due to the negative effect of patent litigation on the patenting 
propensity of the plaintiff SMEs, it should begin with the first year after patent litigation, 
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which is inconsistent with the regression results. I admit that this kind of effect does 
exist. In fact, a firm manager in the sample said that, after experiencing patent litigation, 
they tended to be cautious toward patenting inventions for a process for producing a 
product. However, the regression results support the notion that this may not be the 
main reason for the decrease in subsequent patent applications. On the other hand, the 
fact that the effect of patent litigation with extremely high costs is more significant, both 
in terms of length and magnitude, also supports the argument that the decrease in 
subsequent patent applications is mainly due to the negative effect of patent litigation on 
the plaintiff SMEs’ R&D activities. 
(2) Is the number of forward citations an effective indicator of the strength of patent 
rights? 
Although I have discussed the rationality of the usage of the number of forward 
citations as an indicator of the strength of patent rights in Section 6.2.2, one concern 
about the increase in the number of forward citations is that forward citations may 
increase according to the announcement effect of patent litigation. Patent litigation may 
draw the attention of the firms in the same industry, which will also lead to an increase 
of the number of forward citations received by patents of the plaintiff SMEs. However, 
it should be noted that this announcement effect will not only lead to an increase in the 
number of forward citations of patents applied for by the plaintiff SMEs after patent 
litigation, but it will also lead to an increase in the number of forward citations of 
patents applied for before patent litigation. This effect can be controlled for by the 
fixed-effect model used in this study and will not be reflected in the regression results. 
Therefore, I argue that the significant increase in the number of forward citations 
identified in this study is due to the learning effect of patent litigation instead of the 
announcement effect. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion, implication and future research  
7.1 Conclusion 
I empirically analyze some issues on firms’ patent litigation risk assessment from the 
perspective of patentees in this dissertation. I focus on the probability of patent 
litigation and the stakes of patent litigation in this dissertation. The findings will help 
patentees to evaluate the magnitude of their patent litigation risks. Chapters 3 and 4 
comparatively study patent infringement suits among the US, Japan, and China at the 
patent level. Chapters 5 and 6 study Japanese patent infringement suits at the firm level. 
Chapters 3 makes a comparative study of the effects of different aspects of the value 
of a litigated patent on its patent damage award in the US, Japan, and China. The 
regression results show that court judges in the three countries and juries in the US 
attach importance to different aspects of patent value when deciding patent infringement 
awards. The technological importance of a litigated patent positively impacts its patent 
damage award in Japan but not in the US and China. In contrast, the private economic 
value for the patentee and patent scope of a litigated patent positively impacts its patent 
damage award in China and those ruled on by US judges. In addition, none of the three 
aspects of patent value has a significant impact on patent damage awards ruled by US 
juries. 
Chapter 4 compares the characteristics of patent litigation among the US, Japan, and 
China at the patent level. The effects of three new characteristics of patents on the 
probability of litigation are examined in this study for the first time. I find that the 
number of words or nouns in the independent claim and assertion of domestic priority 
impact the probability of litigation for a given patent negatively and positively, 
respectively. This happens in all the three countries, though the robustness of the results 
is not so good in the US and Japan. Besides, the number of inventors negatively impacts 
the probability of litigation for a given patent, and this finding has good robustness in 
all the three countries. Moreover, I examine whether some previously examined patent 
characteristics have the same effects on the probability of litigation in Japan and China. 
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Several common characteristics of litigated patents are found across the three countries. 
First, patents of higher value (i.e., family size and/or forward citations) are significantly 
more likely to be litigated than those of lower value. Second, patents issued to domestic 
individuals have a higher probability to be litigated than those issued to domestic firms. 
Third, patents issued to domestic business entities are more likely to be litigated than 
those issued to foreign business entities. However, the effect of the number of claims on 
the probability of litigation is complex across countries: it is significantly positive in the 
US, significantly negative in Japan, and insignificant in China. The effect of the number 
of 4-digit IPC subclasses is significantly negative in the US but insignificant though still 
negative in Japan and China. 
Chapter 5 takes Japan as an example to examine whether the characteristics of patent 
portfolios can be used to predict patent litigation at the firm level. High consistency is 
found between the characteristics of patent litigation at the firm level and those at the 
patent level. First, the number of claims has a significantly negative impact on the 
probability of litigation both at the patent level and at the firm level. Second, firms with 
valuable patents are more likely to litigate their patents. Third, the number of backward 
citations has a significantly positive impact on the probability of litigation both at the 
patent level and at the firm level, though the latter does not have a good robustness. 
Fourth, domestic small business entities are more likely to be involved in patent 
litigation than domestic big entities and foreign business entities. However, unlike their 
correspondent variables at the patent level, the three newly tested characteristics－the 
average number of words in the first independent claim, the ratio of patents asserting 
domestic priority, and the average number of inventors－are not found to have a 
significant effect on the probability of litigation at the firm level. 
Chapter 6 examines the effect of patent litigation on plaintiff SMEs’ subsequent 
patenting behaviors. I find that number of patent applications of plaintiff SMEs 
decreases significantly from the first or second year to the third year after litigation. 
This negative effect is even more significant for patent litigation with extremely high 
costs. The most plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that the high costs of 
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patent litigation have a significantly negative effect on the plaintiff SME’s regular R&D 
investment in terms of both money and labor. In addition, the number of forward 
citations received by the patents applied for subsequently after litigation increases 
significantly from the first year to the fourth year after litigation. One plausible 
explanation is that plaintiff SMEs realized the importance of patent quality and learned 
to apply for strong patents during the period of patent litigation. However, this learning 
effect does not last long and plaintiff SMEs tend to return to their original patenting 
strategy in the fifth year after patent litigation. 
7.2 Academic contribution 
This dissertation is the first academic challenge of making an empirical comparison 
between patent litigation in China and those in other countries. Chapter 3 analyzes the 
correlation between patent damage awards and three most well established patent 
indicators. The findings contribute to the literature on patent valuation. To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first attempt in Japan and China. Chapter 4 firstly examines 
the applicability of the effect of patent characteristics on the probability of litigation in 
Japan and China and identifies three new determinants of patent litigation. Furthermore, 
Chapter 5 provides a first attempt to identify characteristics of patent litigation at the 
firm level. The findings contribute to the theories on prediction models of patent 
litigation. Chapter 6 provides the first attempt to study the externality (i.e., learning 
effect) of patent litigation. 
7.3 Practical Implications 
7.3.1 Implication for Industries 
As noted above, patent litigation risk management is becoming an increasingly 
important issue for business entities. The findings in this dissertation help patentees to 
assess the magnitude of their patent litigation risks and decide measures to treat them. 
Considering the high costs of patent litigation, a pretrial settlement is usually a better 
choice for two parties involved in patent disputes. However, in many cases, a pretrial 
settlement is not reached because of two parties’ divergence in the expectation of 
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outcomes of litigation. Therefore, identification of the determinants of patent damage 
awards in Chapter 3 will help the parties of a patent dispute have a similar expectation of 
the stakes of a patent litigation and make them more likely to reach a pretrial settlement. 
Identification of the characteristics of patent litigation in Chapters 4 and 5 will help 
patentees to distinguish the patents of a higher probability of litigation from those of 
lower probability of litigation and evaluate their patent litigation risks more precisely. 
This will help patentees make a better budget and resource allocation for patent 
litigation risk management. For example, knowing patents of a higher probability of 
litigation, patentees can allocate more labor and budget to the detection of infringement 
for these patents and even purchase patent litigation insurance for them if necessary.  
Moreover, the identification of characteristics of litigated patents and patent litigants 
will also promote the development of the patent insurance industry. Although patent 
litigation insurance has been available as an alternative solution to patent litigation risk 
since the early 1980s in the US, Japan, and Europe, very few patentees choose to purchase 
this kind of insurance (Chien, 2011; Duchêne, 2015). One of the most important reasons 
is the problem of adverse selection. Unable to assess patent litigation risk of a given 
patent or a given patentee, insurance companies must increase premiums and limit 
coverage. This hinders most of the patentees, especially individuals and small and 
medium enterprises, from taking advantage of patent litigation insurance. Without 
enough users of patent litigation insurance, insurance companies cannot spread the risk. 
This prevents insurance companies from decreasing the premiums and providing 
broader coverage. The findings on the characteristics of litigated patents and litigating 
patentees help insurance companies to overcome the problem of adverse selection that 
has stunted the development of the patent insurance industry. 
Besides, in view of their weak financial capacity, patent litigation is riskier for SMEs 
than their larger counterparts. Therefore, it is important for SMEs to know the effects of 
patent litigation on their business activities. The findings in this study show that patent 
litigation negatively affects SMEs’ R&D activities during the trial period, but there is a 
learning effect for SMEs to learn to apply for patents with more enforceability. However, 
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the learning effect does not last long due to lack of in-house IP experts. Therefore, this 
study warns that if SMEs want to protect their invention by patent right, it is important 
for them to cultivate internal IP experts or even to establish an IP department if the 
financial condition permits. 
7.3.2 Implication for Policy Making 
This dissertation reveals that judges in different countries in the US attach weight to 
different aspects of the value of the litigated patents when deciding patent damages. 
From the perspective of patentees, patent damage awards should always reflect the 
private economic value of the litigated patent for the patentee. Since the technological 
importance of a patent does not always correlate with its private economic value, the 
courts in Japan should attach more weight toward the private economic value of a 
litigated patent for its patentee rather than merely toward its technological importance. 
Moreover, this study finds that patent damage awards ruled by US juries reflected none 
of the three aspects of the value of litigated patents in question and are significantly 
unpredictable compared with those ruled by US judges. This result recalls the question 
about whether patent juries are qualified to hear patent cases, especially complex ones. 
This finding provides empirical evidence of juries’ incompetence to hear patent cases. 
Furthermore, this study confirms the prior finding that that SMEs are at a greater risk 
of being involved in patent litigation as a patent litigant than their large counterparts 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004; Cremers, 2004). Besides, patent litigation is also 
found to impose such a major burden on plaintiff SMEs that their R&D activities are 
negatively affected. All these findings warn that the patent system does not function well 
for SMEs (Kingston, 2004). As SMEs play an important role in the development of any 
economy in the world, it is essential for policymakers to improve the circumstances for 
SMEs to appropriate their innovations through patent rights. 
7.4 Limitations and Future Research 
Although the analyses in Chapter 3 find the evidence that courts in the US, Japan, and 
China attach different weights to the three aspects of patent value when deciding patent 
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damage awards, the effects of these differences are not analyzed. Future research should 
be conducted to clarify whether the effects of these different patent damage award 
systems affects firms’ R&D investment and patentees’ confidence in patent systems. 
As noted in Section 1.6.3, three IP courts were established in China in 2014, and 
Chinese Patent Law is also undergoing the fourth amendment. All these institutional 
reforms indicate that patent protection is being strengthened in China recently. It will be 
interesting to further analyze the impact of these reforms in China. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Correlations between variables in the dataset ruled by US judges in Chapter 3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Log_patent damages 1         
2.Forward citations 0.149 1        
3.Family size 0.131 0.455** 1       
4.4-digit IPC codes 0.117 0.123 -0.023 1      
5.9-digit IPC codes 0.006 0.175* -0.130 0.644** 1     
6.Age of litigated patent 0.191* 0.109 -0.070 0.081 0.093 1    
7.Number of claims  0.151 0.284** 0.209* 0.023 -0.020 -0.140 1   
8.Plaintiff's lawyers etc. 0.457** 0.271** 0.269** -0.025 -0.130 -0.135 0.286** 1  
9.Defendant's lawyers etc. 0.388** 0.359** 0.368** -0.099 -0.170* -0.235** 0.267** 0.644** 1 
** p＜0.01, * p＜0.05 
 
 
Appendix 2. Correlations between variables in the dataset ruled by US juries in Chapter 3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Log_patent damages 1         
2.Forward citations 0.198 1        
3.Family size 0.214* 0.156 1       
4.4-digit IPC codes -0.035 0.088 0.263** 1      
5.9-digit IPC codes -0.072 0.107 0.227* 0.840** 1     
6.Age of litigated patent 0.114 0.045 -0.052 -0.092 -0.096 1    
7.Number of claims  0.126 0.221* 0.111 0.179 0.174 -0.201* 1   
8.Plaintiff's lawyers etc. 0.293** 0.110 0.040 -0.176 -0.091 0.002 0.041 1  
9.Defendant's lawyers etc. 0.281** 0.012 0.233* -0.058 -0.016 -0.081 0.018 0.596** 1 
** p＜0.01, * p＜0.05 
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Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics of variables in the dataset in Japan in Chapter 3 
 
Minimum Mean Maximum STD. Observations 
Forward citations 0 20.569 2.596  3.404  131 
Family size 1 19 3.115  3.737  131 
4-digit IPC codes 1 6 1.557  0.824  131 
9-digit IPC codes 1 12 2.359  1.954  131 
Age of the litigated patent 0 26 11.069  6.079  131 
Number of claims  1 33 4.359  4.975  131 
Plaintiff's lawyers 0 11 2.771  1.987  131 
Plaintiff's patent attorneys 0 7 1.313  1.259  131 
Defendant 's lawyers 0 12 2.733  2.176  131 
Defendant's patent attorneys 0 5 1.290  1.154  131 
 
 
Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics of variables in the dataset in China in Chapter 3 
 
Minimum Mean Maximum STD. Observations 
Forward citations 1 40 4.929  6.479  507 
Family size 1 4 1.489  0.794  507 
4-digit IPC codes 1 14 2.108  1.529  507 
9-digit IPC codes 2 22 8.093  4.102  507 
Age of the litigated patent 1 117 12.154  14.260  507 
Number of claims  0 3 0.968  0.848  507 
Plaintiff's lawyers 0 3 0.138  0.436  507 
Plaintiff's patent attorneys 0 4 0.874  0.904  507 
Defendant 's lawyers 0 2 0.089  0.311  507 
Defendant's patent attorneys 1 40 4.929  6.479  507 
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Appendix 5. Descriptive statistics of variables in the dataset ruled by US judges in Chapter 3 
 
Minimum Mean Maximum STD. Observations 
Forward citations 0  32.267  3.882  4.896  145 
Family size 1 36 6.648  6.719  145 
4-digit IPC codes 1 4 1.255  0.537  145 
9-digit IPC codes 1 6 1.648  1.004  145 
Age of litigated patent 0 22 8.372  4.975  145 
Number of claims  1 176 23.655  24.442  145 
Plaintiff's lawyers&attorneys 0 18 5.166  3.757  145 
Defendant's lawyers&attorneys 0 17 5.407  4.166  145 
 
Appendix 6. Descriptive statistics of variables in the dataset ruled by US juries in Chapter 3 
 
Minimum Mean Maximum STD. Observations 
Forward citations 0.069  18.823  3.006  3.647  97 
Family size 1 38 6.258  7.121  97 
4-digit IPC codes 1 3 1.124  0.361  97 
9-digit IPC codes 1 4 1.216  0.563  97 
Age of litigated patent 1 20 8.887  4.566  97 
Number of claims  3 89 22.072  17.298  97 
Plaintiff's lawyers&attorneys 0 20 5.309  3.551  97 
Defendant's lawyers&attorneys 0 18 6.258  4.050  97 
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